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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

HATS OFF TO THEM: MUSLIM WOMEN STAND AGAINST
WORKPLACE RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION IN GEO GROUP

INTRODUCTION
The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment states that “Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof.”1 This passage has come to mean that, as with many
other freedoms guaranteed in the Constitution, the freedom to choose and
practice a religion is an inviolable right.2 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 explicitly extended the freedom of religion into the private workplace,
prohibiting, inter alia, religious discrimination.3 Unfortunately, such Title VII
protection was denied to the Appellants in EEOC v. GEO Group, Inc.4 Several
Muslim women were forced to remove their khimars—head coverings which
they felt were central to their faith—based on hypothetical dangers and
imagined harms advanced by their employer.5 In the current climate of fear
and bigotry directed against Muslim-Americans, this may seem like a trivial
slight. However, it unacceptably undermines Title VII’s guarantee against
religious discrimination and exposes all religious adherents to further
intolerance.
The Appellee in this case, GEO Group, Inc., is a private company that
operates prisons for state, county, and local governments.6 GEO ran the
George W. Hill Correctional Facility—the county prison for Delaware County,
Pennsylvania—where Appellants worked during the relevant time period.7
GEO set a dress policy at the prison to “ensure the performance of
[employees’] official duties.”8 In April of 2005, this policy was amended to
provide that “[n]o hats or caps will be permitted to be worn in the facility

1. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2. See Shane Ramsey, Comment, Opting Out of Public School Curricula: Free Exercise
and Establishment Clause Implications, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1199, 1200–01 (2006).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006).
4. EEOC v. GEO Group, Inc., 616 F.3d 265, 277 (3d Cir. 2010).
5. Id. at 267–68.
6. US Detention & Corrections, THE GEO GROUP, INC., http://www.thegeogroupinc.com/
us-corrections.asp (last visited Oct. 7, 2010).
7. Brief of the EEOC as Appellant at 3, 7, 10, 12, EEOC v. GEO Group, Inc., 616 F.3d 265
(3d Cir. 2010) (No. 09-3093) [hereinafter EEOC GEO Group Brief].
8. Id. at 3.
261
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unless issued with the uniform.”9 In an October 2005 memorandum, thenDeputy Warden Matthew Holm announced that “all hats, caps or religious
attire will not be permitted to be worn with your uniform or by non-uniformed
employees unless specifically authorized by the Warden.”10 Thus, GEO had
adopted “a zero-tolerance headgear policy.”11 The warden at the time,
Raymond Nardolillo, explained his reasons for implementing this strict policy:
the “extremely problematic” security issue of “increased introduction of
contraband, specifically drugs” and his realization “that staff were just wearing
whatever they wanted on their heads and it didn’t look well.[sic] It was not a
uniformed appearance.”12
The Appellants, Carmen Sharpe-Allen, Marquita King, and Rashemma
Moss, were female Muslim employees of GEO at the prison.13 They protested
the new, stricter headwear policy, because it specifically banned religious
attire.14 As Muslim women, they felt they were required to wear the khimar, a
headscarf meant to cover the hair and protect a woman’s modesty.15 All three
women sought to be exempted from the policy based on their religious needs,
but were denied.16
Each Appellant confronted the headwear ban under different
circumstances. When she interviewed for her position as a nurse in 2004,
Carmen Sharpe-Allen explained her need to wear the khimar, and was allowed
to do so freely.17 She was on medical leave when the dress code was changed
and was informed that she could no longer wear her khimar upon her return.18
Sharpe-Allen went to speak with Warden Nardolillo about the new policy, and
he gave her the choice between her job and wearing her khimar.19 She would
not compromise on this religious observance and was fired.20
Marquita King worked as an intake specialist at the prison from the year
2000 onward, processing paperwork on incoming prisoners.21 At her
interview, King was asked whether she would be willing to take her khimar off
at work, and she responded affirmatively.22 King was nevertheless allowed to

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Id. at 3–4.
GEO Group, 616 F.3d at 268.
Id.
EEOC GEO Group Brief, supra note 7, at 6.
GEO Group, 616 F.3d at 268.
Id.
EEOC GEO Group Brief, supra note 7, at 7.
GEO Group, 616 F.3d at 268.
Id. at 268–69.
Id. at 269.
Id.
Id.
GEO Group, 616 F.3d at 269.
Id.
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wear her khimar until October 2005.23 At that time, Nardolillo told her that
she would be fired if she showed up with a khimar on her head.24 King took
over four weeks of medical leave due to stress from this incident; when she
returned, King took her khimar off at work.25
Rashemma Moss was hired as a correctional officer in 2002.26 After
taking her shahada, or confession of faith,27 Moss began to wear a triangular
headscarf underneath her uniform hat.28 Nardolillo confronted her and told
Moss she would be suspended without pay if she continued to wear the
headscarf.29 Moss testified to their discussion:
I asked him why were the female inmates that were housed at the facility able
to wear it. He said, “Due to Title 37, they have the right to freedom of
religion.” And then I stated, “Well, I’m not incarcerated, so why don’t I have a
right to freedom of religion?” He said, “Because you’re not. No religion will
30
be honored.” He said this is the battle that he’s choosing to fight.

As she left his office, Nardolillo asked Moss whether wearing her khimar was
really that important to her.31 Moss responded, “[y]es, my religion is important
to me. Isn’t your religion important to you?”32 Nardolillo replied that “he
really didn’t think it made that big of a difference.”33 Moss thereafter stopped
wearing her khimar at work.34
The EEOC, with Sharpe-Allen as the charging party, filed its complaint in
September 2007, alleging that GEO had violated Title VII’s guarantee against
religious discrimination by refusing to accommodate Appellants’ requested
exemption from the dress code.35 In 2008, GEO moved for summary judgment
on the grounds that providing such an exception would constitute an undue
burden, compromising the prison’s safety and security interests.36 The EEOC
opposed GEO’s motion, claiming that the report prepared by the EEOC’s
expert George Camp demonstrated GEO’s concerns were without merit or

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
(2002).
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id.
Id.
Id.
GEO Group, 616 F.3d at 269.
Id.; see JOHN L. ESPOSITO, WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW ABOUT ISLAM 17–18
GEO Group, 616 F.3d at 269.
Id.
EEOC GEO Group Brief, supra note 7, at 13.
Id.
Id.
Id.
GEO Group, 616 F.3d at 269.
Id. at 270.
Id.
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substance.37 The district court under Judge Fullam granted GEO’s motion.38
Judge Fullam found Webb v. City of Philadelphia, decided by the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals in 2009, controlling the decision to grant GEO’s motion.39
The court in Webb upheld a police department’s refusal to permit a female
Muslim police officer to wear her khimar.40 Judge Fullam saw “no meaningful
distinction between prison guards and similar personnel” in GEO Group, and
the police officer in Webb.41 He held that “[t]he same considerations advanced
to justify the regulation in [Webb] apply equally to prison guards and
employees working in the medical department.”42
The Third Circuit decided Webb on August 2, 2010, affirming the trial
court’s grant of summary judgment.43 This follows the general trend in courts
today which defers to employers’ interests over the statutory rights of religious
employees, particularly in the care of Muslim employees.44 This Note seeks to
counter that trend, arguing that social, political, and constitutional policy
suggests that courts should be more willing to protect Muslim employees. Part
I of this Note explores the precedent on reasonable accommodations and undue
hardship, noting the judiciary’s misinterpretation of Congressional intent. This
Part also discusses case law involving Muslim employees’ claims of religious
discrimination in the workplace, and the general pattern they illustrate—a
pattern which undervalues Muslim beliefs and grants substantial deference to
employer’s interests. Part II details the district court’s disposition of the GEO
Group case. It then analyzes the Third Circuit’s opinion of the case, assessing
the majority’s rejection of the Appellants’ discrimination claim and Judge
Tashima’s thorough dissent which comes to their defense. I argue that the
Third Circuit erred in upholding the motion for summary judgment in favor of
GEO. Finally, this Note concludes with some thoughts on the wider
implications of the GEO Group decision.

37. Id.
38. EEOC v. GEO Group, Inc., No. 07-cv-04043-JF, 2009 WL 1382914, at *1 (E.D. Pa.
May 18, 2009). See infra Part II.A for more of Judge Fullam’s reasoning.
39. GEO Group, 2009 WL 1382914, at *1.
40. Webb v. City of Phila., 562 F.3d 256, 258, 264 (3d Cir. 2009). Webb is more fully
discussed infra Part I.B, notes 152–64 and accompanying text.
41. GEO Group, 2009 WL 1382914, at *1.
42. Id.
43. EEOC v. GEO Group, Inc., 616 F.3d 265, 265, 277 (3d Cir. 2010).
44. See Karen Engle, The Persistence of Neutrality: The Failure of the Religious
Accommodation Provision to Redeem Title VII, 76 TEX. L. REV. 317, 321, 361 (1997); Ishra
Solieman, Note, Born Osama: Muslim-American Employment Discrimination, 51 ARIZ. L. REV.
1069, 1083, 1085, 1086–87, 1092 (2009).
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I. TITLE VII RELIGIOUS ACCOMMODATION AND MUSLIM RELIGIOUS
PRACTICES
A.

Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship

Understanding the evolution of Title VII religious discrimination requires a
discussion of the current form of such a claim. To make a prima facie case of
religious discrimination, an employee must show: “(1) she holds a sincere
religious belief that conflicts with a job requirement; (2) she informed her
employer of the conflict; and (3) she was disciplined for failing to comply with
the conflicting requirement.”45 After an employee makes a prima facie case,
the burden then shifts to the employer.46 The employer can only carry its
burden by showing “[1] it made a good-faith effort to reasonably accommodate
the religious belief, or [2] such an accommodation would work an undue
hardship upon the employer and its business.”47
The concepts of “reasonable accommodation” and “undue hardship”
discussed above were not an explicit part of Title VII as it was enacted in
1964. The original enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 made
discrimination unlawful in many areas of public life.48 Title VII of the Act
extended this protection into the employment context.49 It prohibited
discrimination against employees in hiring, classification, or segregation based
on a number of traits, including religion.50 Still, the Act made no mention of
employees’ rights to practice their religion in the workplace, to observe

45. GEO Group, 616 F.3d at 271 (quoting Webb v. City of Phila., 562 F.3d 256, 259 (3d Cir.
2009)).
46. Id.
47. Id. (quoting Webb, 562 F.3d at 259).
48. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (current version at 42
U.S.C. §§ 1981–2000h-6 (2006)). The current version of the Civil Rights Act extends protection
to access to courts, rights to bring legal actions, and rights under law, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981–83
(2006); prisoners’ rights, id. § 1997e; access to public accommodations and facilities, id. §
2000a(a)–(b); public education, id. § 2000c; access to federally assisted programs, id. § 2000c-4;
and disclosures during voting, id. § 2000f.
49. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006)).
50. Id. Section 2000e-2(a) currently provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer—
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way
which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities
or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual’s
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

266

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 56:261

practices which would impact their work, or employers’ obligations to allow
employees to do so.51 Title VII failed to define “religion” at all, and did not
expressly indicate whether protection against religious discrimination covered
religious practices as well as beliefs.52
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, created by Title VII to
help resolve employment disputes, interpreted the ban against religious
discrimination to include a requirement that employers accommodate
employees’ religious practices.53 The EEOC clarified the extent of the
employer’s obligation, initially as ending where the accommodation would
create “serious inconvenience to the conduct of the [employer’s] business,”54
and later where the accommodation would cause “undue hardship” to the
employer.55 However, courts were not bound by the EEOC’s interpretation, as
shown by two cases from the early 1970s.
In Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., the Sixth Circuit overturned a verdict in
favor of Dewey, who had complained of wrongful discharge on account of his
Dewey refused to work on Sundays, though his
religious beliefs.56
employment contract provided for occasional mandatory weekend work.57 The
court acknowledged that “[n]o one disputes Dewey’s right to his religious
beliefs,” but stated the issue as “whether he has the right to impose his
religious beliefs on his employer.”58 The court answered the in the negative,
finding that “[t]he employer ought not to be forced to accommodate each of the
varying religious beliefs and practices of his employees.”59 In response to
Dewey’s claim that the court construed Title VII too narrowly, the court held
that “[n]owhere in the legislative history of the Act do we find any
Congressional intent to coerce or compel one person to accede to or
Though the EEOC
accommodate the religious beliefs of another.”60
regulations required accommodation of religious practices, the court judged

51. See Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703.
52. See id. But see note 68 and accompanying text (describing the 1972 amendment adding
a definition of “religion”).
53. The Commission was created by Section 2000e-4. Section 2004e-4(g)(4) provides that
“[t]he Commission shall have power . . . upon the request of (i) any employer, whose employees
or some of them, or (ii) any labor organization, whose members or some of them, refuse or
threaten to refuse to cooperate in effectuating the provisions of this subchapter, to assist in such
effectuation by conciliation or such other remedial action as is provided by this subchapter.”
54. 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1(a)(2) (1967).
55. 29 C.F.R. § 1605.2(b) (2010).
56. Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F.2d 324, 327–28, 332 (6th Cir. 1970), aff’d by an
equally divided court, 402 U.S. 689 (1971).
57. Id. at 328.
58. Id. at 335.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 334.
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that this was inconsistent with Title VII.61 The U.S. Supreme Court, upon
grant of certiorari, affirmed the 6th Circuit’s decision by an equally divided
Court.62
The next year, in Riley v. Bendix Corp., a Florida district court denied
Riley’s wrongful discharge-religious discrimination claim.63 Riley refused to
work from sundown on Friday to sundown on Saturday, based on his faith in
the Seventh Day Adventist Church.64 Like the Dewey court, the district judge
gave little weight to the EEOC’s regulations as evidence of Congress’ true
intentions regarding Title VII.65 The court explained its interpretation of Title
VII thusly:
The guarantee of religious freedom in the United States has resulted in many
forms of religion, religious philosophies and sects, and it is the absolute right
of every person that these beliefs shall not be infringed upon. An employer
may not refuse to employ or discharge any person because of his religious
beliefs, but surely the great and diversified types of American business cannot
be expected to accede to the wishes of every doctrine or religious belief. If one
accepts a position knowing that it may in some way impinge upon his religious
beliefs, he must conform to the working conditions of his employer or seek
66
other employment.

In 1972, Congress responded to Dewey and Riley by amending Title VII’s
definition of “religion.”67 Congress added section 701(j), which reads: “[t]he
term ‘religion’ includes all aspects of religious observance and practice, as
well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably
accommodate to an employee’s or prospective employee’s religious
observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the
employer’s business.”68 This language is substantially similar to that of the
EEOC’s regulations on reasonable accommodation and undue hardship
discussed above.69 While the courts in Dewey and Riley specifically rejected

61. Dewey, 429 F.2d at 334.
62. Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 402 U.S. 689, 689 (1971).
63. Riley v. Bendix Corp., 330 F. Supp. 583, 591 (M.D. Fla. 1971).
64. Id. at 584.
65. Id. at 588.
66. Id. at 590.
67. See 118 CONG. REC. 705–13 (1972) (statement of Sen. Randolph) (discussing a proposal
to amend Title VII to protect the fundamental right to be free from religious discrimination that
“our courts have on occasion determined . . . is nebulous”). Congress included Dewey and Riley
in the legislative record of 701(j) to show specifically the reasoning they meant to overturn in
amending Title VII. Id. at 706–13.
68. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2006).
69. Bilal Zaheer, Note, Accommodating Minority Religions Under Title VII: How Muslims
Make the Case for a New Interpretation of Section 701(J), 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 497, 508 (2007).
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applying the EEOC’s regulations, Congress demonstrated with 701(j) that
those regulations embodied the legislative intent behind Title VII.70
This intent is confirmed by the statement of Senator Jennings Randolph,
the main proponent of 701(j). As a member of a minority religion, Senator
Randolph was concerned about how Title VII’s religious discrimination
provision was being interpreted.71 He equated the concept of religious
freedom in the First Amendment with that in Title VII; this concept included
“not merely belief, but also conduct; the freedom to believe, and also the
freedom to act.”72 According to Senator Randolph, judicial interpretation had
“clouded” this essential element of Title VII, and so legislative action was
needed to bring courts back to what “was originally intended by the Civil
Rights Act.”73 Even with this great advance in the cause of employees’
religious rights, there was a critical flaw with 701(j) as enacted in 1972.
Congress used the terms “reasonable accommodation” and “undue hardship,”
but failed to define them, leaving courts with wide discretion to interpret their
meaning.74 Since 1972, the courts have again gone the way of Riley and
Dewey; while the duty to accommodate is recognized, courts have negated its
practical effectiveness by heavily favoring employers’ interests.75
The U.S. Supreme Court established this deferential stance in two seminal
cases, which analyzed the duty to accommodate and the standard for
evaluating undue hardship. First was Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison,
where in 1977 the Supreme Court held that TWA could not reasonably
accommodate, without suffering undue hardship, an employee whose religious
obligations prohibited him from working on Saturdays.76 The Court noted that
701(j) makes an employer’s obligation to make reasonable accommodations
clear, but it does not define the extent of the obligation.77 Thus, in seeking to

70. See Reid v. Memphis Publ’g Co., 468 F.2d 346, 351 (6th Cir. 1972) (The “legislative
history of this amendment stresses that the regulation (29 C.F.R. § 1605.1) [701(j)] did express
the prior intention of Congress. This subsequent congressional affirmation strengthens our
conclusion about the validity of the regulation.”); Riley v. Bendix Corp., 464 F.2d 1113, 1116
(5th Cir. 1972) (“If there were any doubt as to the effect to be given to these guidelines because
of a lingering doubt as to whether they truly expressed the will of Congress, a significant event
[the addition of the 701(j) amendment] has since transpired which lays to rest any such doubt.”);
Mich. Dep’t of Civil Rights v. Gen. Motors Corp., 317 N.W.2d 16, 25 (Mich. 1982) (“Indeed, the
1972 amendment was characterized as having validated or affirmed the [EEOC] guideline’s
interpretation of Title VII’s ban on religious discrimination.”).
71. 118 CONG. REC. 705 (1972) (statement of Sen. Randolph).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 705–06.
74. Nantiya Ruan, Accommodating Respectful Religious Expression in the Workplace, 92
MARQ. L. REV. 1, 14–15 (2008); Zaheer, supra note 69, at 509.
75. Zaheer, supra note 69, at 510.
76. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977).
77. Id. at 74.
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define it, the Court held that religious accommodations create an undue
hardship when they impose more than a de minimis cost on the employer.78
The Court further explained that Title VII’s protection against discrimination
applies for “majorities as well as minorities,” and that “[i]t would be
anomalous to conclude that by ‘reasonable accommodation’ Congress meant
that an employer must . . . deprive [other employees] of their contractual rights,
in order to accommodate or prefer the religious needs of others.”79
Justice Marshall’s dissent in Hardison characterized the decision as a
“fatal blow to all efforts under Title VII to accommodate . . . religious
practices.”80 The majority had simply construed the EEOC’s current
regulations and the newly amended Civil Rights Act to “not really mean what
they say.”81 “[A] society that truly values religious pluralism,” Marshall
argued, “cannot compel adherents of minority religions to make the cruel
choice of surrendering their religion or their job.”82 And, of course, the
Hardison majority takes “the very position that Congress expressly rejected in
1972” when it added 701(j) to Title VII.83
The Court decided Ansonia Board of Education v. Philbrook in 1986,
explaining the “reasonable accommodation” aspect of employers’ duty to
accommodate.84 There, an employee brought suit against his employer for
refusing to allow him to miss work for six days per year for religious
observance.85 The Court found “no basis in either the statute [701(j)] or its
legislative history” requiring an employer to make any specific
accommodation.86 Additionally, “where the employer has already reasonably
accommodated the employee’s religious needs, the statutory inquiry is at an
end.”87 While the Court stated that 701(j) provides little guidance in regards to

78. Id. at 84. De minimis, meaning trifling or minimal, from the Latin de minimis non curat
lex (“The law does not concern itself with trifles.”). BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 496 (9th ed.
2009). In his Hardison dissent, Justice Marshall “seriously question[ed] whether simple English
usage permits ‘undue hardship’ to be interpreted to mean ‘more than de minimis cost.’”
Hardison, 432 U.S. at 93 n.6 (Marshall, J., dissenting). He felt that the majority did not
adequately explain the undue hardship standard, and that the Court “may have believed that such
a burden exists whenever any cost is incurred by the employer, no matter how slight.” Id. at 92
n.6 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
79. Hardison, 432 U.S. at 81.
80. Id. at 86 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
81. Id. at 86–87 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
82. Id. at 87 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
83. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
84. Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 68–69 (1986).
85. Id. at 62–63. The employee, Ronald Philbrook, became a member of the Worldwide
Church of God in 1968. Id. at 62. This faith requires adherents to avoid secular work on holy
days, which fall on approximately six school days per year. Id. at 62–63.
86. Id. at 68.
87. Id.
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reasonable accommodation, it did note that Senator Randolph hoped employers
would be flexible in accommodating employees’ religious practices.88 With
that in mind, the Court found that “bilateral cooperation” between employer
and employee to find a reasonable accommodation is appropriate.89 Still, the
Court did not want employees to be able to wait for the best accommodation
possible.90 Thus, the Court held that an employer need only show that it
offered a reasonable accommodation to satisfy its duty under 701(j).91 The
Court remanded for additional factual findings to determine whether the
accommodation in this case was reasonable, but it did reiterate Hardison’s
holding that 701(j) “did not impose a duty on the employer to accommodate at
all costs.”92 The Court did suggest its opinion on the matter: permitting the
employee to take unpaid leave to observe a holy day would be reasonable,
except when paid leave is provided “for all purposes except religious ones.”93
Justice Marshall, as he did in Hardison, dissented from the majority.94
Marshall argued that “if the accommodation offered by the employer does not
completely resolve the employee’s conflict, I would hold that the employer
remains under an obligation to consider whatever reasonable proposals the
employee may submit.”95 If the employee does make a reasonable, more
effective proposal which does not result in undue hardship, Marshall would
have required the employer to implement it.96
The reasonable accommodation and undue hardship analysis created in
Hardison and Ansonia survives to the present. The federal courts have closely
followed that stance of minimizing employees’ religious needs and deferring to
employers’ business interests.97 There are a number of recurrent themes in
these cases, some of which come from Supreme Court directives and some
which are extensions of the same principles. Employers satisfy their duty to

88. Id. at 69.
89. Ansonia, 479 U.S. at 69.
90. Id. The Court of Appeals below held that the employer must accept the accommodation
proposal preferred by the employee unless that proposal causes undue hardship. Philbrook v.
Ansonia Bd. of Educ., 757 F.2d 476, 484 (2d Cir. 1985). The Court here expressly rejected that
approach. Ansonia, 479 U.S. at 69.
91. Ansonia, 479 U.S. at 69.
92. Id. at 70–71. Justice Stevens concurred in the Court’s decision to reject the appellate
court’s analysis, but dissented in the disposition. He was willing, on the record provided, to find
that Philbrook had failed to state a claim of religious discrimination. Id. at 81 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
93. Id. at 71.
94. Id. at 71–75.
95. Id. at 73 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
96. Ansonia, 479 U.S. at 74 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
97. See infra notes 98–103 and accompanying text.
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accommodate once they make any reasonable offer.98 Though Ansonia held
that bilateral cooperation was required to find reasonable accommodations,
courts often do not seem to require much cooperation from employers;
employers’ offered accommodation need not be “the ‘most’ reasonable one (in
the employee’s view), it need not be the one the employee suggests or prefers,
and it need not be the one that least burdens the employee.”99 Courts can also
find that the accommodations requested by employees are excessive.100
If the reasonable accommodation analysis favors employers, showing
undue hardship is virtually certain. The de minimis standard has been
interpreted to create a very low burden on employers.101 Though courts claim

98. Morrissette-Brown v. Mobile Infirmary Med. Ctr., 506 F.3d 1317, 1322 (11th Cir. 2007)
(“[T]he inquiry ends when an employer shows that a reasonable accommodation was afforded the
employee, regardless of whether that accommodation is one which the employee suggested.”
(quoting Beadle v. Hillsborough Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 29 F.3d 589, 592 (11th Cir. 1994)));
Cosme v. Henderson, 287 F.3d 152, 158 (2d Cir. 2002) (“[T]o avoid Title VII liability, the
employer need not offer the accommodation the employee prefers. Instead, when any reasonable
accommodation is provided, the statutory inquiry ends.”).
99. Shelton v. Univ. of Med. & Dentistry of N.J., 223 F.3d 220, 225 (3d Cir. 2000); see also
Sturgill v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 512 F.3d 1024, 1033 (8th Cir. 2008) (“Bilateral cooperation .
. . requires accommodation by the employee, and a reasonable jury may find in many
circumstances that the employee must either compromise a religious observance or practice, or
accept a less desirable job or less favorable working conditions.”); Creusere v. Bd. of Educ. of
City Sch. Dist. of Cincinnati, 88 F. App’x 813, 819 (6th Cir. 2003) (“An employer only needs to
make reasonable accommodations for an employee’s religion. This principle does not require the
employer to accommodate the employee in the way the employee finds to be the most
desirable.”); Bruff v. N. Miss. Health Servs., Inc., 244 F.3d 495, 501 (5th Cir. 2001) (“Once the
[employer] establishes that it offered [the employee] a reasonable accommodation, even if that
alternative is not her preference, they have, as a matter of law, satisfied their obligation under
Title VII.”). But see Thomas v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 225 F.3d 1149, 1156 (10th Cir.
2000) (“Although an employer has a duty reasonably to accommodate an employee’s religious
beliefs or to show that reasonable accommodation cannot be made without undue hardship, this
duty does not obligate the employer to consider and preclude an infinite number of possible
accommodations. In the interactive process between employer and employee, the employer here
considered every accommodation requested by Thomas and rightfully rejected each as unduly
burdensome.”); Debbie N. Kaminer, Religious Conduct and the Immutability Requirement: Title
VII’s Failure to Protect Religious Employees in the Workplace, 17 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 453,
466–67 (2010) (finding that while “courts agree that a religious employee has a duty to cooperate
with his employer,” the courts are divided on the extent of that duty; some circuits imply that an
employee has a duty to compromise their religious beliefs to find an accommodation, while other
circuits do not).
100. EEOC v. Firestone Fibers & Textiles Co., 515 F.3d 307, 319 (4th Cir. 2008).
101. One of the few cases to find that an employer could not meet its burden is OpukuBoateng v. California, 95 F.3d 1461 (9th Cir. 1996). There, the employee’s religious beliefs
required him to observe a Saturday Sabbath. Id. at 1464. Though the State did make a good faith
effort to accommodate him, the negotiations for potential accommodations were not successful.
Id. at 1468. The State claimed that the employee’s proposed accommodations would impose
undue hardship. Id. at 1469. Though the State argued that mandatory shift-swapping would
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to be “somewhat skeptical of hypothetical hardships,” some nevertheless hold
that “it is possible for an employer to prove undue hardship without actually
having undertaken any of the possible accommodations.”102 Particularly
relevant to this Note, courts recognize that definitions of “hardship” differ
between paramilitary employers, such as police departments, and nonparamilitary employers. Police departments and other such paramilitary
employers are given even more deference regarding the reasonableness of
accommodations and the severity of hardships than their non-paramilitary
counterparts; this premise is the foundation of the majority’s holding in Webb,
which is in turn central to the outcome of GEO Group.103

upset other employees, the court held that “hypothetical morale problems are clearly insufficient
to establish undue hardship.” Id. at 1473. The mere possibility that other employees would
“grumble” or that it may be impossible to fulfill others’ requests for similar accommodations did
not establish hardship. Id. at 1473–74. “Far more concrete undue hardship [beyond
hypotheticals] is required before an employer can be said to have met its burden,” and this must
be supported by real evidence. Id. at 1474. Some commentators argue that courts’ reluctance to
conduct a substantial sincerity review for employees’ religious beliefs has created our current
weak undue hardship standard. Jamie Darin Prenkert & Julie Manning Magid, A Hobson’s
Choice Model for Religious Accommodation, 43 AM. BUS. L.J. 467, 489 & n.117 (2006). This
permits employers to satisfy their burden by speculating about potential hardships and lets
coworkers complain that the religious employees’ beliefs are being imposed upon them. Id. at
490.
102. Cloutier v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 390 F.3d 126, 135 (1st Cir. 2004) (quoting Draper
v. U.S. Pipe & Foundry Co., 527 F.2d 515, 520 (6th Cir. 1975)); see also Bruff, 244 F.3d at 501.
But see Anderson v. Gen. Dynamics Convair Aerospace Div., 589 F.2d 397, 402 (9th Cir. 1978)
(“Undue hardship means something greater than hardship. Undue hardship cannot be proved by
assumptions nor by opinions based on hypothetical facts.”); Ali v. Se. Neighborhood House, 519
F. Supp. 489, 494 (D.D.C. 1981) (“Despite this lack of direction [in 701(j)], some guideposts
have been constructed by courts addressing the duty to make a reasonable accommodation . . . .
[T]o satisfy the statutory requirement, the employer must show present undue hardship, as
distinguished from anticipated or multiplied hardship.”).
103. See infra notes 152–164 and accompanying text; see also Blair v. Graham Corr. Ctr.,
782 F. Supp. 411, 414 (C.D. Ill. 1992) (holding that it is more difficult for paramilitary employers
to accommodate employees’ beliefs and practices, especially in regards to sabbaths, religious
holidays, and time off). Endres v. Indiana State Police supports deference to paramilitary
employers in a slightly different context. 349 F.3d 922, 923 (7th Cir. 2003). In Endres, the court
held that public safety agencies, such as fire and police departments, have virtually no burden to
accommodate religious employees’ requests to avoid assignments that would conflict with their
beliefs. Id. at 925. The dissent agreed that such employers should be given “a great deal of
latitude in accommodating . . . their employees [requests] for exemptions from particular duties.”
Id. at 929 (Ripple, J., dissenting). However, the dissent concluded that “Congress simply did not
determine that these agencies ought to be given a blanket exemption from the mandate of [Title
VII].” Id. at 929–30. It then addressed the deeper problem with the majority’s view: “[p]ublic
safety and emergency personnel, whose contributions to our daily lives are so much more
appreciated these days, have every right to ask why this court has singled them out as not
deserving of a statutory protection guaranteed to every other person in the United States.” Id. at
930.
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Congress was not completely idle while courts pulled the teeth of 701(j).
In recent years, it has proposed a measure which would force the judiciary to
comply with the spirit of Title VII’s religious discrimination provisions: the
Workplace Religious Freedom Act (“WRFA”). This Act was first proposed in
1994, and has been reintroduced in most years since.104 Some of the most
recent versions of the bill were introduced in the House and Senate in 2007 and
2008, respectively.105 These bills are narrower in scope than previous versions
of WRFA, but they still provide for important changes to current Title VII
religious discrimination law.106
Both bills drastically redefine the undue hardship standard created by the
Supreme Court in Hardison. Instead of hardship becoming “undue” if it
entails more than a de minimis cost, WRFA states that only if an
accommodation “imposes significant difficulty or expense” will the hardship
created be “undue.”107 Both also specifically include religious clothing,
grooming, and taking time off for religious observance as practices within the
envelope of 701(j)’s protection.108
The House bill further explains the new undue hardship standard. The
factors for determining such hardship include identifiable (as opposed to
hypothetical) costs of the accommodation, the size and resources of the
employer, and for employers with multiple facilities, the ability to run each
The House bill also provides that reasonable
facility separately.109
accommodations must remove the conflict between work and the religious
practice.110 An employer fails to reasonably accommodate when it refuses to
allow an employee to take general leave under the employment contract, solely
because the employer knows that employee will use the leave for religious
observance.111 WRFA is yet to be enacted, but its prospects for becoming law

104. Debbie N. Kaminer, When Business and Employees’ Religion Clash, N.Y. L.J., July 21,
2000, at 1.
105. S. 3628, 110th Cong. (2008); H.R. 1431, 110th Cong. (2007).
106. These versions were narrowed so as to gain broader support for WRFA. Earlier versions
were supported by a wide range of religious groups but opposed “by a virtually unbeatable
coalition,” including: the ACLU, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, employers, and unions.
Thomas C. Berg, Religious Liberty in America at the End of the Century, 16 J.L. & RELIGION
187, 214 (2001). These opponents felt that the bill was overbroad and would impose religion into
the workplace while burdening non-religious employees. See Lauren E. Bohn, Workplace
Religious Freedom Bill Finds Revived Interest, HUFFINGTON POST (July, 3, 2010, 5:12 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/05/03/workplace-religious-free_n_561560.html.
107. S. 3628, § 2(a)(1)(B). The House bill has nearly identical language. H.R. 1431, §
2(a)(4).
108. See S. 3628, § 2(a)(1)(B); H.R. 1431, § 2(a)(4).
109. H.R. 1431, § 2(a)(4).
110. Id. § 2(b).
111. Id.
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are improving.112 Until WRFA is passed, the judiciary’s interpretation of
701(j) will continue to defer to employers’ interests at the expense of
employees’ rights to observe their religions.
B.

Accommodating Muslim Religious Practices in the Workplace

With the understanding that Title VII religious discrimination has been
interpreted to favor the employer, it is not surprising that Muslims have faced
great difficulty protecting their right to practice their faith in the workplace.
This is particularly true because of general American antipathy towards
Muslims in recent history, especially since the terrorist attacks of September
11, 2001.113 EEOC statistics show that the number of religious discrimination
complaints by Muslims has increased dramatically since September 11.114
Still, there are relatively few court opinions produced from these disputes.115
There are certain beliefs and requirements for followers of Islam that most
often conflict with employers’ priorities and interests.116
Of course, Islam is not practiced identically across the country or the
globe, so the following beliefs may be considered mandatory, or permissive
and subject to interpretation, depending on the location and the individual’s
personal religious choices.117 Failure to accommodate prayer is the one of the
most common complaints by Muslim employees.118 Muslims pray five times
per day, for a few minutes each time.119 Muslim men also participate in
special prayers held each Friday at a mosque.120 Islamic grooming and dress
standards also cause friction between employer and employee. Men are

112. See Bohn, supra note 106 (suggesting that the reintroduction of WRFA is “attracting
renewed attention that could lead to [Congressional] action”).
113. See Broad Skepticism of Islam Marks Post-9/11 Sentiment, ABC NEWS/WASHINGTON
POST POLL: VIEWS OF ISLAM, http://abcnews.go.com/images/International/Islam_views.pdf (last
visited Sept. 23, 2011); see also RITA J. SIMON & MOHAMED ALAA ABDEL-MONEIM, PUBLIC
OPINION IN THE UNITED STATES: STUDIES OF RACE, RELIGION, GENDER, AND ISSUES THAT
MATTER 29–39 (2010) (providing poll data from a national survey on American attitudes toward
the Muslim-American community).
114. See Press Release, EEOC, EEOC Provides Answers About Workplace Rights of
Muslims, Arabs, South Asians, and Sikhs (May 15, 2002), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/
press/5-15-02.html. Muslims have complained of being called “terrorists” or “Osama” by their
co-workers, among other ethnic and racial epithets, being refused prayer breaks, and, as in the
GEO Group case, being barred from wearing head scarves. Steven Greenhouse, Offended
Muslims Speak Up, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2010, at B1.
115. Zaheer, supra note 69, at 504.
116. See id. at 502–04.
117. See ESPOSITO, supra note 27, at 39.
118. Zaheer, supra note 69, at 505.
119. ESPOSITO, supra note 27, at 18.
120. Zaheer, supra note 69, at 502.
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encouraged to wear beards as a show of piety.121 Some interpretations of Islam
hold that women should dress in body-covering clothing that hides the female
form, including khimars, which cover the head and neck.122 Some Muslims,
such as the Appellants in GEO Group, believe this dress style to be mandatory
to protect women’s modesty.123
For Muslims’ daily prayers, it can be difficult, though not impossible, for
employees to convince courts that five short breaks each day do not impose
undue hardship on their employers. In Haliye v. Celestica Corp., the defendant
employer was denied summary judgment on the employee plaintiffs’ claim of a
failure to accommodate their daily prayer needs.124 The court noted that the

121. ESPOSITO, supra note 27, at 101. Religious facial hair is not limited to Islam. Some
interpretations of Judaism, namely Orthodox and Hasidic Jews, also support the wearing of
traditional beards. See 3 ENCYCLOPAEDIA JUDAICA, Beard and Shaving 235–36 (Fred Skolnik &
Michael Berenbaum eds., 2d ed. 2007). Sikhism likely has the most stringent bearding
requirement, believing that those who fail to follow its grooming and dress practices have
renounced the faith. 2 THE ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF SIKHISM, Kesadhari 465–66 (Harbans Singh ed.,
2d ed. 2001). Sarah Wolkinson, in analyzing the Bhatia v. Chevron U.S.A. case, finds that Sikh
men’s bearding practice, like female Muslim veiling, is vulnerable to “unwarranted [employer]
policies that lead to discrimination.” See Sarah Abigail Wolkinson, Comment, A Critical
Historical and Legal Reappraisal of Bhatia v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc.: Judicial Emasculation of the
Duty of Accommodation, 12 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 1185, 1199–1200 (2010). There, a Sikh man was
suspended and later demoted for refusing to comply with a new policy requiring men to be cleanshaven so that respirators could fit cleanly on their faces. Bhatia v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 734
F.2d 1382, 1383 (9th Cir. 1984). As Wolkinson notes, despite the fact that the Chief of
California’s Division of Occupational Safety and Health found the that the potential for an
emergency requiring a respirator was remote, and that he was suspicious of Chevron’s policy as
being overly expansive, the court granted summary judgment against Bhatia. Wolkinson, supra,
at 1197 (citing Letter from Art Carter, Chief, Cal. Div. of Occupational Safety and Health, to
R.W. Davis, Chevron U.S.A., Inc. (June 17, 1982)); Bhatia, 734 F.2d at 1384. Wolkinson argues
that it is “not only within the capacity of the courts to challenge and overturn discriminatory
policies,” but is in fact the court’s duty to protect minority religious practices. Wolkinson, supra,
1199–1200.
122. See ESPOSITO, supra note 27, at 95.
123. See Report of Dr. Carol Harris-Shapiro at 5–6, Webb v. City of Phila., 562 F.3d 256
(2009) (No. 05-CV-5238), 2006 WL 4585522 (explaining that the veiling and modesty
requirements come from the Qur’an); Zaheer, supra note 69, at 504.
124. Haliye v. Celestica Corp., 717 F. Supp. 2d 873, 881 (D. Minn. 2010); see also Tyson v.
Clarian Health Partners, Inc., No. 1:02-CV-01888-DFH-TA, 2004 WL 1629538 (S.D. Ind. June
17, 2004). In Tyson, the employer sought summary judgment on a Muslim employee’s failure to
accommodate claim. Id. at *5–6. Clarian had allowed Tyson to conduct her daily prayers, either
in a non-denominational chapel or in the basement. Id. at *4. The court granted summary
judgment on this issue, finding that this was a reasonable accommodation, though it did not
necessarily satisfy “[Tyson’s] every desire.” Id. at *5. The court made a distinction between the
prayers themselves, which Clarian had properly accommodated, and the ablution, or ritual
washing, before the prayers. Id. Tyson had used the shower in an empty patient room to perform
the ablution, and the court found that “a jury could easily find that the shower incident played a
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defendant generally allowed employees to take unscheduled bathroom breaks,
while forbidding plaintiffs from taking unscheduled prayer breaks.125 The
court specifically mentioned that it “has its doubts that plaintiffs are similarly
situated to employees who take occasional breaks to use the bathroom.”126
Still, because the defendants had “essentially ignored this aspect of plaintiffs’
claims,” the court could not grant summary judgment in their favor on this
issue.127 The court’s “doubts” about the similarity between unscheduled
bathroom breaks and unscheduled prayer breaks illustrate that the court found
bathroom breaks potentially more necessary or important than Muslim prayers.
Friday prayers are usually a more troublesome issue. Courts often find that
it would cause undue hardship on employers to allow Muslim employees to
take time off on Fridays to perform their required prayers.128 In McLaughlin v.
New York City Board of Education, the court found that a Muslim teacher was
reasonably accommodated when he was allowed to leave work early on

prominent, even catalytic, role in Clarian’s decision to fire her.” Id. at *5–6. Thus, Clarian was
denied summary judgment on the issue of reasonably accommodating Tyson’s ablution. Id. at *6.
125. Haliye, 717 F. Supp. 2d at 881.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. See Mohamed v. Pub. Health Trust of Miami-Dade Cnty., No. 09-21235-CIV, 2010 WL
2844616 (S.D. Fla. July 19, 2010). In that case, summary judgment was granted against a
Muslim plaintiff who claimed that his employer failed to accommodate his religious practice. Id.
at *12. Under a previous administration, plaintiff used saved vacation time to take off work early
on Fridays to attend religious services. Id. at *1. When a new administration took over, plaintiff
sought approval for this arrangement. Id. Though he was eventually given approval, it took a
long time and he was made to go back and forth among supervisors. Id. at *1–2. His supervisor
told him that “[t]his is a Christian country. If I give you time off to go to the mosque, I have to
give everybody time off to go to church. We don’t kill people here. Your religion is your
problem. Deal with it.” Id. at *2. Plaintiff felt that the new administration had no real intention
of allowing him to take Friday off early, and thus he never attempted to. Id. at *5. The court
rejected plaintiff’s contention that there was a failure to accommodate, because plaintiff asked the
court to speculate as to his employer’s reaction to taking Fridays off, when plaintiff never actually
did so. Id. at *6. But see Ahad v. Nicholson, No. 3:07-00414, 2008 WL 842458 (M.D. Tenn.
Mar. 28, 2008) (summary judgment granted against plaintiff because he was allowed to attend
Friday prayers; although he wanted this accommodation in writing and testified that “all efforts
are being made to make if [sic] difficult for me to attend,” he produced no evidence of a failure to
accommodate). Another important tenet of Islam which can create time-off problems is the
pilgrimage to Mecca, or hajj, which should be made at least once in a person’s lifetime, and may
be attempted more than once if the person has the means and ability to do so. Hussein v. UPMC
Mercy Hosp., No. 2:09-cv-00547, 2011 WL 13751, at *3 (W.D. Penn. Jan. 4, 2011); ESPOSITO,
supra note 27, at 21. As with other Islamic practices, courts sometimes have difficulty finding
that the hajj can be reasonably accommodated. In Hussein, a Muslim employee was denied his
request for vacation time to take a second pilgrimage to Mecca. Hussein, 2011 WL 13751, at *4.
Though the court recognized the importance of the hajj as a foundational element of his religious
beliefs, it concluded that because he had already made one pilgrimage, the second was “a matter
of personal preference” and did not have to be accommodated. Id. at *8–9.
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Fridays, except for the second Friday of each month when faculty conferences
were held.129 Of course, this ruling ignores the fact that Islamic religious
practice does not excuse men from Friday prayers on the second Friday of each
month.
In Elmenayer v. ABF Freight Systems, the plaintiff sought to add an
additional fifteen minutes to his hour-long lunch break so that he could attend
Friday prayers.130 His employer denied this request, claiming that it would
adversely affect worker morale.131 The court held that the employer’s offered
accommodation—having Elmenayer bid for evening and night shifts—was
reasonable, over Elmenayer’s argument that his proposal was much less
drastic.132 Elmenayer further argued that he may not even succeed in bidding
for the night shifts, and so the conflict between his religious observance and
employment requirements would remain.133 This problem had not yet
occurred, and so the court rejected the contention; but, if the conflict had
occurred, the court found that the employer’s obligation to accommodate “may
well have required it to do more for him.”134 Though courts are willing to
accept hypothetical hardships from employers, Elmenayer suggests that
employees are unable to advance similar arguments.
Muslim grooming and dress practices are often challenged by employers as
detrimental to professionalism, company image, or safety.135 Two cases
regarding men’s beards are particularly relevant to GEO Group: Valdes v. New
Jersey and Wallace v. City of Philadelphia. In Valdes, the plaintiff was
discharged from correctional officer training for refusing to trim his beard.136
After filing an EEOC complaint, his employer exempted him from a general
prohibition against facial hair, but limited his beard’s length to one-eighth of
an inch.137 The court noted that the plaintiff failed to abide by this agreedupon limitation, but it did not discuss whether the plaintiff’s genuine beliefs
allowed him to trim his beard at all, much less to so short a length.138

129. McLaughlin v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Educ., No. 04 Civ. 1270(FM), 2008 WL 216308, at *14
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2008). The employer took five months to approve even this accommodation.
Id. at *15.
130. Elmenayer v. ABF Freight Sys., No. 98-CV-4061 (JG), 2001 WL 1152815, at *2
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2001).
131. Id. at *3.
132. Id. at *6.
133. Id.
134. Id. at *7.
135. See Wallace v. City of Phila., No. 06-4236, 2010 WL 1730850, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 26,
2010); Valdes v. New Jersey, No. 05-3510 (GEB), 2007 WL 1657354, at *6 (D. N.J. June 6,
2007).
136. Valdes, 2007 WL 1657354, at *2.
137. Id. at *1.
138. See id. at *7.
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The recent Wallace case also involved a limit on beard length, though in a
police department rather than a prison.139 There, the department allowed
Wallace to wear a beard, but only to the extent allowed under the department’s
medical exception.140 The court explicitly acknowledged the plaintiff’s beliefs
did not allow him to comply with the beard length limit.141 Still, the court
ruled against him, because the police department complained that permitting
plaintiff to wear a longer beard would “sacrific[e] the Department’s
commitment to a neutral appearances policy.”142 The courts in these cases
gave even greater deference to correctional and police departments than other
employers, and found that accommodations which admittedly conflicted with
the employees’ beliefs were nonetheless reasonable.143
Islamic beliefs about women’s dress regularly conflict with employers’
However, some courts will not accept employers’
dress policies.144
“professionalism” and “company image” arguments without solid evidence of
undue hardship.145 In the education context, a Muslim woman was not allowed

139. Wallace, 2010 WL 1730850, at *1.
140. Id. at *2.
141. Id. at *6.
142. Id. at *7.
143. The Third Circuit’s City of Newark case, although not based on Title VII law, provides
an interesting counterpoint to these two cases. Fraternal Order of Police v. City of Newark, 170
F.3d 359 (3d Cir. 1999). Its reasoning will be discussed in relation to Title VII. See infra Part
II.C.
144. Cases like GEO Group continue to emerge. In United States v. New York City Transit
Authority, the Department of Justice brought an action alleging discrimination against Muslim
and Sikh employees in regards to their religious headwear. United States v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth.,
No. 04-CV-4237, 2010 WL 3855191, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2010). The Transit Authority had
a headgear policy which allowed only official caps to be worn. Id. However, this was loosely
enforced, especially in the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, when employees
began to wear fire and police department hats as a show of solidarity. Id. at *2. In 2002, the
Transit Authority began to enforce the headgear policy against some Muslim bus drivers who
wore khimars under their uniform caps. Id. at *3. Because the women refused to remove their
khimars, they were moved to positions without public interaction. Id. at *3–4. The court refused
to grant summary judgment in favor of the Transit Authority, finding that this change in position
was not a reasonable accommodation as a matter of law; the women felt it was a demotion, while
the Transit Authority contended it was in fact a better position. Id. at *17–18. The court also
found that the Transit Authority could not establish undue hardship, in part because its uniform
headgear requirement was not based on safety or legitimate business concerns. Id. at *21.
145. See, e.g., EEOC v. White Lodging Servs. Corp., No. 3:06CV-353-S, 2010 WL 1416676
(W.D. Ky. Mar. 31, 2010) (Muslim women not given interviews for housekeeping jobs after
telling interviewer that it would be “impossible” for them to remove their hijabs, where other
applicants not wearing hijabs were allowed to interview); EEOC v. Alamo Rent-A-Car LLC, 432
F. Supp. 2d 1006, 1016–17 (D. Ariz. 2006). In Alamo, Ms. Bilan Nur sought to wear her veil
during Ramadan. Id. at 1008. Nur was permitted to wear it while working in the back office, but
not while working at the rental counter. Id. at 1009. The court held that this was not a reasonable
accommodation, because the company still expected Nur to work the front desk, and so she
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to wear religious clothing because it would interfere with the public school’s
interest in religious neutrality.146 Where the employer puts forward a safety
concern, courts are reluctant to question it. The women in Mohamed-Sheik v.
Golden Foods/Golden Brands LLC told their employer that they could not
wear form-fitting, tucked-in shirts, because their beliefs did not allow them to
dress like a man or reveal their female shape.147 Golden Brands argued that
allowing the plaintiffs to wear extra-long, untucked shirts would create an
undue safety risk, as the clothing could become entangled in moving
machinery.148 The company testified that it “could” lose customers if it
allowed this exception to the dress code, and further that the code is “fairly
common” in the industry.149 Ultimately, the court found that the undue
hardship on Golden Brands “would seem to be clear,” if not for other
discrimination issues raised by the plaintiffs.150 The court found this hardship

would be forced to remove her head covering. Id. at 1013. Additionally, the court did not accept
Alamo’s contention that “any deviation from [Alamo’s] carefully cultivated image is a definite
burden.” Id. at 1015. The court found that this was no more than a hypothetical hardship; thus,
“[a]lthough [Alamo] concluded that accommodating Ms. Nur’s request to wear a head covering at
the rental counter might have imposed a cost on Alamo because it would have opened the
floodgates to others violating the uniform policy, Alamo has not supplied any basis for
concluding that those opinions were anything other than pure speculation.” Id. at 1016.
146. United States v. Bd. of Educ. for Sch. Dist. of Phila., 911 F.2d 882, 885–86, 890 (3d Cir.
1990). Pennsylvania retained a “garb statute” from 1895 that banned religious attire in public
schools. Id. at 885. The Third Circuit, in examining a very similar situation that appeared before
the Oregon Supreme Court and later the U.S. Supreme Court, found that the results of those cases
upheld the Oregon statutes (the Third Circuit went to great lengths to confirm that the U.S.
Supreme Court’s dismissal of the Oregon case “for want of a substantial federal question”
constituted an affirmation that the Oregon statutes did not violate Title VII). Id. at 887–90. Thus,
Pennsylvania’s own statute did not violate Title VII, because forcing public schools “to sacrifice a
compelling state interest [in religious neutrality] would undeniably constitute an undue hardship.”
Id. at 890. Because the “garb statute” was constitutional, allowing the Muslim woman to wear
religious attire would be unlawful and would therefore impose undue hardship on the school. Id.
at 889–90.
147. Mohamed-Sheik v. Golden Foods/Golden Brands LLC, No. Civ.A. 303CV737H, 2006
WL 709573, at *1 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 16, 2006).
148. Id. at *3.
149. Id.
150. Id. at *5. These other issues were related to increased hostility towards the plaintiffs
after September 11, 2001. Id. The court noted:
Golden Brands became uncomfortable with Hersi and Mohamed because of their religion
and exhibited this discomfort through [the HR manager’s] arguably hostile comments to
the Plaintiffs regarding praying at work, Head [sic] scarves, and speaking their native
language. It was [the HR manager] who apparently made the decision to begin enforcing
the tuck in policy at Golden Brands, and there is no evidence that the policy had been
enforced, at least as to the Plaintiffs, prior to February 19, 2002.
Id. The court held that this raised issues of material fact as to “whether allowing an
accommodation to the tuck in policy would in fact present an undue hardship to Golden Brands
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to be undue, despite acknowledging that the tuck-in policy was not always
enforced, and relying primarily on the testimony of Golden Brands’s own
consultant as to the extent of the safety risk.151
Many of the issues noted above involving Muslim religious practice in the
workplace were present in Webb v. City of Philadelphia.152 This case, decided
in 2009 in the Third Circuit, provided critical precedent for the majority
opinion in GEO Group.153 Kimberlie Webb, a female Muslim police officer
and eight-year veteran of the Philadelphia police force, requested permission to
wear her khimar while on duty.154 Her request was denied, and she was later
suspended for refusing to remove her khimar upon arriving at work.155 The
appellate court reiterated that in Hardison, the Supreme Court “strongly
suggest[ed] that the undue hardship test is not a difficult threshold to pass.”156
The court also explained that courts must give substantial deference to law
enforcement agencies in the area of uniforms and dress codes.157
Finding that Webb’s belief was sincere and that the City admittedly offered
no accommodation, the court then analyzed whether any accommodation could
be implemented with creating an undue hardship.158 The City argued that strict
enforcement of the uniform code promoted “the essential values of
impartiality, religious neutrality, uniformity, and the subordination of personal
preference” that are necessary in properly-run police departments.159 The
Philadelphia police commissioner testified that it was “critically important to
promote the image of a disciplined, identifiable and impartial police force by
maintaining the Philadelphia Police Department uniform as a symbol of neutral
government authority, free from expressions of personal religion, bent or
bias.”160 The court found that para-military organizations, like police
departments, have an interest in uniformity amongst their employees, and
sacrificing this interest created more than a de minimis cost.161 Ultimately, the
court upheld summary judgment against Webb because “uniform requirements
are crucial to the safety of officers (so that the public will be able to identify
where there is evidence that safety concerns may not have been the exclusive, or even the primary
factor behind the enforcement of the policy.” Id.
151. Id. at *3–5.
152. 562 F.3d 256 (3d Cir. 2009).
153. See infra Part II.B. The Webb case was dispositive for the district court’s judgment in
GEO Group. See infra Part II.A.
154. Webb, 562 F.3d at 258.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 260 (quoting United States v. Bd. of Educ. for Sch. Dist. of Phila., 911 F.2d 882,
890 (3d Cir. 1990)).
157. Id. at 260–61.
158. Id. at 261.
159. Webb, 562 F.3d at 261.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 261–62.
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officers as genuine, based on their uniform appearance), morale and esprit de
corps, and public confidence in the police.”162
The court took Philadelphia Police Commissioner Johnson’s testimony
regarding the extent of the hardship as uncontroverted.163 The court never
addressed the expert testimony of Dr. Carol Harris-Shapiro, whose report
indicated that Webb’s sincere belief about wearing her khimar came directly
from the Qur’an.164 Apparently, when the unstoppable force of an employer’s,
and specifically para-military employer’s, interests meets the immovable
object of an employee’s sincere and foundational religious belief, the belief
must give way. Or, rather, the belief is considered movable and subject to
interpretation, whereas the “facts” of the undue hardship are not. These issues
will be discussed further in Part II.C in relation to the GEO Group decision.
II. GEO GROUP
Now we turn to the GEO Group case itself. First, this part will show how
the district court’s disposition of GEO Group fits under the Webb precedent.
Next, it will outline the appellate court’s majority position. Judge Tashima’s
thorough dissent will also be discussed. Finally, this part critiques the
majority’s decision in GEO Group as a misinterpretation of the facts and of the
purpose of Title VII. Additionally, it suggests that the majority should be more
willing to protect Muslim beliefs given their growing importance in American
life, and given the current cultural, political, and social environment which is at
times strongly anti-Muslim.
Recall that the dispute in GEO Group was between three female Muslim
prison employees and their employer, a private company which runs prisons in
the United States.165 GEO had adopted a zero-tolerance headgear policy, citing
safety, contraband and uniformity of appearance concerns.166 The prison
supervisors had refused the women’s requests to have their religious garb
exempted from the headgear ban, and they brought suit claiming a violation of
their Title VII right to be free of religious discrimination in the workplace.167

162. Id. at 262.
163. Id. at 261.
164. Report of Dr. Carol Harris-Shapiro at 4, Webb v. City of Phila., 562 F.3d 256 (2009)
(No. 05-CV-5238-HB), 2006 WL 4585522.
165. EEOC v. GEO Group, Inc., 616 F.3d 265, 267–68 (3d Cir. 2010).
166. Id. at 268.
167. Id. at 270.
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The District Court Decision

Judge Fullam of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania wrote a brief
memorandum on the disposition of this case.168 Fullam cited Webb as the
controlling precedent; in fact, the GEO Group case was stayed in anticipation
of the Third Circuit’s ruling in Webb.169 The judge noted that in Webb, a
police department could lawfully discharge a female Muslim officer for
wearing the head covering required by her religion.170 The officer in Webb had
failed to adhere to the department’s uniform regulations, which did not allow
for such religious observance.171
Judge Fullam found no distinction between Webb and the instant case.172
He concluded that there was no meaningful distinction between prison guards
and police officers.173 Under the Webb precedent, GEO could properly refuse
to permit a Muslim prison guard to wear their required head coverings while
on duty.174 He further noted that the justifications that GEO advanced for its
dress policy could apply equally to other prison employees, such as those
working in the medical department.175 Thus, on cross-motions for summary
judgment, Judge Fullam denied the EEOC’s motion and granted GEO Group’s
motion.176
B.

The Third Circuit’s Analysis
1.

The Majority—GEO would suffer undue hardship if it accommodated
Appellants’ religious practice

The Third Circuit held that GEO made a sufficient showing that it could
not reasonably accommodate Appellants’ religious practice without suffering
an undue hardship.177 As a threshold matter, the court confirmed that
Appellants stated a prima facie case of religious discrimination.178 GEO first

168. EEOC v. GEO Group, Inc., No. 07-cv-04043-JF, 2009 WL 1382914, at *1 (E.D. Pa.
May 18, 2009).
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. GEO Group, 2009 WL 1382914, at *1.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. EEOC v. GEO Group, Inc., 616 F.3d 265, 275 (3d Cir. 2010).
178. They demonstrated the prima facie case by showing that their sincere belief in the
necessity of their khimars conflicted with GEO’s headgear policy, that they asked for exemption
from it, and GEO responded by variously terminating or threatening to terminate the women. Id.
at 268–69. However, GEO did not contend on appeal that the EEOC had failed to make its prima
facie case. Id. at 271.
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argued that it offered a reasonable accommodation to the Appellants, “by
offering to permit [them] to wear a hairpiece in place of the khimar.”179 While
Appellants may not have preferred this accommodation, another female
Muslim employee found it acceptable, and it reasonably “fulfills the stated
religious requirement that the hair be covered.”180 The court rejected GEO’s
argument, as it was “unwilling to delve into any matters of theology . . . to
decide on our own what might constitute a reasonable substitute for a khimar
under the Islamic faith.”181
The court addressed GEO’s primary contention that it could not provide
the accommodation Appellants sought without suffering undue hardship.182 In
explaining the de minimis standard, the court noted that both economic and
non-economic costs can impose undue hardship.183 For example, an
accommodation “that creates a genuine safety or security risk can undoubtedly
constitute an undue hardship for an employer-prison.”184 The court cited
Webb, which had interpreted the U.S. Supreme Court’s Hardison decision to
“strongly suggest[] that the undue hardship test is not a difficult threshold to
pass.”185 Still, an undue hardship inquiry requires a court to examine the
“specific context of each case” and determine the magnitude of the purported
hardship.186 The court stated its agreement with Appellants that “the Webb
court did not purport to establish a per se rule of law about religious head
coverings,” or their relationship to “paramilitary organization” cases.187
However, the court still found Webb relevant, as “some security and uniformity
interests held by the police force [in Webb] are also implicated in the prison
context.”188
The court explained GEO’s argument regarding the problems that would
arise if Appellants were accommodated according to their wishes. First,
uniform appearance is crucial in a prison environment to promote discipline
and esprit de corps.189 Allowing Appellants to wear khimars would undermine
this legitimate interest.190 Second, the procedures necessary to accommodate
Muslim employees wearing their khimars would create delays and require

179. Brief of Defendant at 13, EEOC v. GEO Group, Inc., 616 F.3d 265 (3d Cir. 2010) (No.
09-3093), 2009 WL 5635542 [hereinafter GEO GEO Group Brief].
180. Id. at 13–14.
181. GEO Group, 616 F.3d at 271.
182. Id. at 273.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. (quoting Webb v. City of Phila., 562 F.3d 256, 260 (3d Cir. 2009)).
186. GEO Group, 616 F.3d at 273.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
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additional resources from prison officials.191 Though the court was “not
entirely convinced” of the seriousness of this issue, it “recognize[d] that
adopting [GEO’s] proposed procedure would necessarily require some
additional time and resources of prison officials.”192 Finally, the khimars
themselves present a safety risk, because they could be used to smuggle
contraband, conceal the identity of the wearer, or could be used by inmates to
strangle guards.193 GEO acknowledged that incidents of these types had not
occurred in the relevant history of the prison facility.194 The court nevertheless
found that “[e]ven assuming khimars present only a small threat of the asserted
dangers, they do present a threat which is something that GEO is entitled to
attempt to prevent.”195
The key fact that tipped this admittedly “close case” in GEO’s favor was
the prison environment.196 “A prison is not a summer camp,” the court found,
and GEO “has an overriding responsibility to ensure the safety of its prisoners,
its staff, and the visitors.”197 This reasoning was based on the U.S. Supreme
Court’s decision in Bell v. Wolfish.198 There, the Court noted that prison “is a
unique place fraught with serious security dangers.”199 In GEO, the court
found that Wolfish “cautioned the federal courts to make only limited inquiry
into prison management because ‘[t]he wide range of ‘judgment calls’ that
meet constitutional and statutory requirements are confided to officials outside
of the Judicial Branch of Government.’”200 Thus, although federal courts can
still uphold the constitutional rights of prison staff, deference must be given to
prison officials’ determinations on how to run their prisons.201
191. GEO Group, 616 F.3d at 274.
192. Id. The issue was one of identification of the women as they moved through numerous
checkpoints in the prison while wearing their khimars. Id. GEO argued that having the women
remove their khimars at each checkpoint would require locking down the prisoners in that area.
GEO GEO Group Brief, supra note 179, at 18.
193. GEO Group, 616 F.3d at 274.
194. GEO GEO Group Brief, supra note 179, at 17.
195. GEO Group, 616 F.3d at 274.
196. Id. at 275.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979).
200. GEO Group, 616 F.3d at 275 (citing Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 562).
201. Id. The Third Circuit has carried this deference to prison officials into other areas. In
Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of Burlington, the court held that in the interest of
safety, a prison may strip search all incoming inmates, regardless of any reasonable suspicion that
they might be carrying contraband. 621 F.3d 296, 310–11 (3d Cir. 2010). The court found that
the prisons’ security interest outweighed the inmates’ Fourth Amendment privacy interest. See
id. at 311. As was the case in GEO, prison officials were not required to produce any evidence
that there actually existed a contraband problem, such as statistics on the discovery of contraband
on incoming inmates. Id. at 309–10. The court also rejected the inmate’s suggestion that a bodyscanning chair could be used instead of full-nudity body cavity searches. Id. at 310.
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After discussing the reasoning behind its disposition of the case, the court
went on to rebut Judge Tashima’s dissenting opinion.202 The court found that
the dissent was “unfairly cynical” when criticizing the reasons for the noheadgear policy proffered by Deputy Warden Holm and Warden Nardolillo.203
The court reiterated that despite Judge Tashima’s skepticism of the burden on
GEO, allowing Appellants to wear their khimars at work would create undue
hardship.204 The procedures for safe khimar-wearing suggested by Appellants
were “facially implausible and time consuming.”205 The court also addressed
the dissent’s claim that khimars are unlikely to be used as weapons.206 It noted
that traditional khimars are large enough to be used for strangulation.207
Further, the dissent’s argument that other employees are allowed to wear hats,
such as kitchen employees, is in the court’s opinion “just another red
herring.”208 Those employees must wear hats for sanitary purposes, and they
cannot wear their hats outside of the kitchen.209 Finally, the court criticized the
dissent for relying on the EEOC’s expert testimony more than the testimony of
experienced prison officials.210 The court pointed to the Supreme Court’s
language in Turner v. Safley:
Running a prison is an inordinately difficult undertaking that requires
expertise, planning, and the commitment of resources . . . . Prison
administration is, moreover, a task that has been committed to the
responsibility of [the legislative and executive] branches, and separation of
powers concerns counsel a policy of judicial restraint. Where a state penal
system is involved, federal courts have . . . additional reason to accord
211
deference to the appropriate prison authorities.

The court also noted that “[a]s the en banc Ninth Circuit recently stated, its
obligation is ‘to comply with the Supreme Court’s direction that we not
substitute our judgment for that of corrections facility officials.’”212

202. GEO Group, 616 F.3d at 275.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 276.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. GEO Group, 616 F.3d at 276.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 276–77.
211. Id. at 277 (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84–85 (1987)).
212. GEO Group, 616 F.3d at 277 (quoting Bull v. City and Cnty. of S.F., 595 F.3d 964, 978
(9th Cir. 2010)).
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Judge Tashima’s Dissent—The majority undermines the Circuit’s
religious accommodation jurisprudence

Judge A. Wallace Tashima, Senior Judge of the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals, sat by designation in this case (thus the majority’s above reference to
a Ninth Circuit opinion).213 Judge Tashima dissented in GEO Group because
he felt that “the majority misapplies both longstanding Circuit law on how we
review summary judgment and, in doing so, ignores our substantive Title VII
law,”214 and that the court’s decision “makes a shambles of our Title VII
religious accommodation jurisprudence.”215 A full discussion of summary
judgment law is beyond the scope of this note, but Judge Tashima raises an
important point. Judge Tashima’s summary judgment argument rests on his
contention that Appellants have raised issues of material fact.216 These issues,
which should be decided by a jury, include the reasons for changing the
headgear policy, the extent of the safety risk created by wearing khimars, and
the magnitude of the burden on GEO if Appellants were accommodated.217
All of these issues bear on the Title VII analysis in this case. Judge
Tashima argued that the majority “allows an employer facing an asserted
safety concern freely to discriminate on the basis of religion by merely
inventing a post-hoc safety rationale.”218 The employer cannot merely assert
an important business interest as reason for denying accommodation, but must
provide evidence that the accommodation would result in more than a de
minimis cost for them.219 The majority did not hold GEO to this burden,

213. Id. at 267.
214. Id. at 277 (Tashima, J., dissenting).
215. Id. at 292 (Tashima, J., dissenting).
216. Id. at 286 (Tashima, J., dissenting). In a related point, Judge Tashima also found that the
majority failed to properly apply the summary judgment standard, which requires that the
Appellants’ evidence should be believed, and reasonable inferences be made in their favor. Id. at
277–78 (Tashima, J., dissenting). Instead, the majority chose to believe Warden Nardolillo and
Deputy Warden Holm and disbelieve Appellants’ expert and other evidence. Id. at 277 (Tashima,
J., dissenting). Ironically, courts in the Third Circuit continue to cite the very summary judgment
language in GEO Group that Judge Tashima felt was misapplied. See Lora-Pena v. Denney, 760
F. Supp. 2d 458, 464–65 (D. Del. 2011) (“At the summary judgment stage, the judge’s function is
not to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter, but to determine whether there is
a genuine issue for trial. The judge must ask not whether the evidence unmistakably favors one
side or the other, but whether a fair-minded jury could return a verdict for the plaintiff on the
evidence presented. The court must not engage in the making of ‘[c]redibility determinations, the
weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts’ as these ‘are
jury functions, not those of a judge, [when] [ ] ruling on a motion for summary judgment.’”)
(internal citations omitted); see also Riley v. Shinseki, No. 09-4345, 2011 WL 18760, at *3 (3d
Cir. Jan. 5, 2011).
217. GEO Group, 616 F.3d at 286–89 (Tashima, J., dissenting).
218. Id. at 285 (Tashima, J., dissenting).
219. Id. (Tashima, J., dissenting).
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however, because it failed to “perform the necessary inquiry into whether
making a religious exception from the general headgear ban to accommodate
khimars would, in fact, impose such an undue hardship on GEO.”220 Though
the majority did consider this a “close case,” it “effectively exempts” GEO
from the requirement that GEO prove undue hardship, and “concludes that this
requirement is met merely because GEO has asserted that its hardship is
safety.”221 Judge Tashima found that the majority’s holding “establishes a per
se rule that when an employer asserts that its rationale for denying a religious
accommodation is safety, the employer need not adduce any evidence to prove
the existence of, let alone the magnitude of, the burden it would suffer by
accommodating the religious practice.”222 Therefore, though GEO’s interest in
safety is an important one, it does not relieve them of their burden to show
undue hardship.223
Judge Tashima also argued that Webb v. City of Philadelphia did not
control the disposition of GEO Group.224 As discussed earlier, the relevant
issue in Webb was the police department’s interest in uniform appearance
amongst its officers.225 The District Court openly rested on Webb, finding “no
meaningful distinction between prison [employees] . . . and police officers.”226
The majority in GEO Group disclaimed that “[i]t is unnecessary for us to
decide whether this interest alone would support summary judgment, as we
decide the case on different grounds,”227 but Judge Tashima disputed whether
any other grounds were available.228
Unlike the police department in Webb, which had an interest in
“impartiality, religious neutrality, [and] uniformity,”229 GEO’s employees “do
not serve as an impartial symbol of law enforcement authority to the general
public.”230 The Webb police department was concerned about the “safety of
officers (so that the public will be able to identify officers as genuine, based on
their uniform appearance), morale and esprit de corps, and public confidence in
the police.”231 Judge Tashima found no evidence that any prisoners thought

220. Id. (Tashima, J., dissenting).
221. Id. (Tashima, J., dissenting).
222. GEO Group, 616 F.3d at 285 (Tashima, J., dissenting).
223. Id. (Tashima, J., dissenting).
224. Id. at 289–90 (Tashima, J., dissenting).
225. See supra notes 152–64 and accompanying text for a discussion of the uniform
appearance interest in Webb.
226. EEOC v. GEO Group, Inc., No. 07-cv-04043-JF, 2009 WL 1382914, at *1 (E.D. Pa.
May 18, 2009).
227. GEO Group, 616 F.3d at 274.
228. Id. at 289–90 (Tashima, J., dissenting).
229. Webb v. City of Phila., 562 F.3d 256, 261 (3d Cir. 2009).
230. GEO Group, 616 F.3d at 290 (Tashima, J., dissenting).
231. Webb, 562 F.3d at 262.
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that a khimar-wearing GEO employee was not a genuine employee.232 The
judge also found no evidence that prisoners felt religious discrimination due to
a GEO employee wearing a khimar, or that “being a prison guard requires the
same level of cohesiveness and esprit de corps of a paramilitary organization
such as the police.”233 Finally, Judge Tashima saw no indication in Webb that
non-uniformed department employees, who rarely interacted with the public,
were not allowed to wear khimars.234 In the present case, Sharpe-Allen and
King worked as a prison nurse and intake officer, respectively.235 Because
these positions “certainly do not share the same safety or morale concerns as
sworn police officers,” Judge Tashima found it “disingenuous, at best, for
GEO to argue that it would work an undue hardship to allow them to wear nonuniform attire.”236
Judge Tashima concluded that “GEO’s interest in uniformity only
encompassed an aesthetic disapproval of employees starting a ‘fad or fashion
statement’ by wearing khimars.”237 This interest, the judge noted, is not “of
the greatest importance,” as was the uniformity interest in Webb.238 Though
“GEO is free to ban its employees from wearing Yankees caps backwards and
sideways” because of aesthetic disapproval, “they are not free to ban khimars
for the same reason.”239
Judge Tashima was also not convinced that GEO made a good-faith
attempt to accommodate the Appellants.240 The judge found that the only
accommodation they offered was unreasonable as a matter of law.241 Ansonia
holds that proposed accommodations are only reasonable if they eliminate the
conflict between job requirements and the employee’s ability to fully observe

232. GEO Group, 616 F.3d at 290 (Tashima, J., dissenting).
233. Id. (Tashima, J., dissenting). Judge Tashima noted that the very reason why the
government would contract out prison administration to private companies like GEO is that
unlike police departments, “a prison need not be run by an official, governmental, paramilitary
organization.” Id. at 290 n.4 (Tashima, J., dissenting).
234. Id. at 290 (Tashima, J., dissenting).
235. Id. at 268–69.
236. Id. at 290 (Tashima, J., dissenting).
237. GEO Group, 616 F.3d at 290–91 (Tashima, J., dissenting). Moss testified that Warden
Nardolillo did not want her to start a “fad or fashion statement” among other employees by
wearing her khimar at the prison. Id. at 286 (Tashima, J., dissenting).
238. Id. at 291 (Tashima, J., dissenting).
239. Id. (Tashima, J., dissenting). Here, Judge Tashima referenced Deputy Warden Holm’s
testimony about the reason for implementing the new headgear policy. Holm was unhappy with
seeing “‘New York Yankees baseball hat inside the institution while in full uniform, [which was]
not authorized’ as well as ‘hats being worn backwards and sideways.’” Id. at 283 (Tashima, J.,
dissenting).
240. Id. at 291.
241. Id.
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their religious practice.242 GEO had offered to allow Appellants to wear a
hairpiece, most likely a wig, to cover their hair instead of a khimar.243 Judge
Tashima and the majority agreed that Appellants’ belief in the necessity of
wearing the khimar was sincere.244 Appellants maintained that Qur’ranic
requirements would not be satisfied by wearing a wig.245 Judge Tashima noted
that “[a]n employer is not entitled to interpret the employee’s religion.”246
“Just as it is not reasonable to ask a Christian employee to observe Christmas
in July,” Judge Tashima felt it was unreasonable to ask Appellants to accept an
insufficient accommodation, and thereby display their hair in public against the
tenets of their faith.247 Ultimately, “[i]t is neither the court’s nor the
employer’s prerogative to dictate to an employee how she should comply with
the requirements of her religion,” and so if Appellants sincerely believe the
hairpiece fails to satisfy their religious obligation, then it is by law an
unreasonable accommodation.248
C. Author’s Analysis—The court should have found that GEO could have
reasonably accommodated the Appellants without undue hardship, and
the court should have defended Appellants from religious discrimination,
given the current climate of fear and hate against Muslims
As we have seen, the Third Circuit in GEO Group followed the general
trend which gives great weight to employers’ business interests and relatively
little weight to employees’ religious needs. For a number of reasons, the court
should have abandoned this interpretation, finding instead that Appellants
could be reasonably accommodated with causing undue hardship to GEO. The
court’s conclusions about safety risks and the feasibility of allowing
Appellants to wear khimars in the prison were based on GEO’s proffered
hypotheticals, when the court should have conducted a more thorough hardship
analysis. Appellants’ religious beliefs also should have been valued more
highly because religious freedom and tolerance is ensconced in our
Constitution and case law.249 The court ought to have been particularly
protective of Appellants’ religious practice in light of the vulnerable position
that Muslims occupy in modern American society.250 Finally, the court could

242. Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 70 (1986).
243. GEO GEO Group Brief, supra note 179, at 13.
244. GEO Group, 616 F.3d at 271, 291 (Tashima, J., dissenting).
245. Id. at 291 (Tashima, J., dissenting).
246. Id. (Tashima, J., dissenting).
247. Id. (Tashima, J., dissenting).
248. Id. (Tashima, J., dissenting).
249. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. I; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310
U.S. 296, 303–04 (1940).
250. See infra notes 270–74 and accompanying text.
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have attempted to follow the weight of scholarship in this area of law, which
advocates for greater protection of employees’ right to practice their faiths.
The majority agrees with GEO’s speculation that allowing employees to
wear khimars in the prison facility would create a safety and contraband
risk.251 The court found that even if these purported risks were much less
severe than GEO claimed, GEO would still have a right to attempt to prevent
them.252 There are a number of problems with this position. GEO claimed that
contraband could be smuggled into the prison under a khimar.253 The court
accepted this hypothetical burden on the prison even though GEO admitted
that this had never happened before.254 Contraband always finds its way into
prisons, no matter what security measures are put in place.255 Given enough
time, any person, including an inmate, could probably devise a method to
circumvent nearly any conceivable security system.256 Inmates can use
visitors, incoming inmates, and other areas of contact with the outside world,
including prison employees, to obtain contraband.257 Using a khimar to
smuggle contraband in to the prison, given the plethora of tried-and-true
smuggling options, seems unnecessary. Judge Tashima noted that contraband
might more easily be smuggled in under a wig, which was GEO’s offer of

251.
252.
253.
254.
255.

GEO Group, 616 F.3d at 275.
Id. at 274.
Id.
Id.
See JOSEPH BOUCHARD, WAKE UP AND SMELL THE CONTRABAND: A GUIDE TO
IMPROVING PRISON SAFETY vii, 3 (2002) (describing, from the view of a corrections employee,
contraband as “an insidious monster lurking in every correctional facility” that moves with
relative ease within and into prisons); DAVID B. KALINICH, THE INMATE ECONOMY 1 (1980)
(addressing contraband and related issues in State Prison Southern Michigan); VERGIL L.
WILLIAMS & MARY FISH, CONVICTS, CODES, AND CONTRABAND: THE PRISON LIFE OF MEN
AND WOMEN 133 (1974) (comparing the sub rosa (illicit) economies in male and female prisons).
With respect to the influx of contraband, men tend to bring in more material from outside the
prison, while women are more likely to steal goods directly from the prison. Id. Prison guards
have little effect on the enormous flow of contraband through prisons. Id. at 92. This may be due
to corruption, ignorance, or sympathy for the prisoners. Id.; see also Matt Clarke, Contraband
Smuggling by Texas Prison Guards Rarely Punished Harshly, PRISON LEGAL NEWS, Sept. 2009,
at 32 (discussing minimal punishment for prison guards caught smuggling contraband); Tracy E.
Barnhart, Contraband Control in Prison, CORRECTIONS.COM (Apr. 6, 2009), http://www.correc
tions.com/news/article/21045 (discussing behaviors to look for in visitors who may be smuggling
contraband).
256. See Brief of the States as Amici Curiae in Support of the Petition at 5–6, Smith v. AlAmin, 129 S. Ct. 104 (2008) (No. 07-1485), 2008 WL 2676561 (noting the numerous ways that
contraband has been smuggled into prisons, including mailing marijuana concealed within “legal
papers,” enclosing a hacksaw blade in the binding of a legal pad, and sending escape tools in a
hollowed-out legal brief).
257. KALINICH, supra note 255, at 67; Barnhart, supra note 255.
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accommodation, than under a khimar.258 Additionally, because GEO does not
perform contraband checks on other employee clothing, such as socks or
jackets, prohibiting khimars would probably do little to diminish the
contraband problem.259
The other essential part of GEO’s case was the claim that khimars posed a
safety risk in the prison.260 The khimars at issue in this case presumably rest
on the wearer’s head and shoulders, and wrap around their neck.261
Admittedly, this creates a risk that inmates might grab the khimar and pull on it
to suffocate the employee wearing it. The problem is that such a risk may be
ever-present, whether an employee is wearing a khimar or not. If an inmate
had the opportunity, desire, and freedom of movement necessary to grab an
employee’s khimar and pull on it hard enough to choke, it seems just as likely
that the inmate could have also put their arm around the employee’s neck
instead. As the majority notes, prisons are a dangerous place.262 Wearing a
khimar over one’s head does not seem to drastically increase the level of
danger.
The arguments above are not meant to completely refute the majority’s
reliance on GEO’s testimony as to the hardship it may face in allowing
Appellants to wear their khimars. It is meant instead to tip the balance of the
“close case” in favor of Appellants. As shown above, there is a potential
discrepancy between GEO’s hypothetical hardships and those that would likely
exist in reality. Given that this results in a much lower hardship burden on
GEO than the majority anticipated, the court should have found for the
258. GEO Group, 616 F.3d at 291 n.5 (3d Cir. 2010) (Tashima, J., dissenting).
259. Id. at 289 (Tashima, J., dissenting). Judge Tashima found that there is little reason why
Appellants would be forced to remove their khimars at each checkpoint in the prison; this forms
the basis of GEO’s assertion that accommodating would create administrative problems. Id.
(Tashima, J., dissenting). GEO’s reason to require removal of the khimars could not be to find
contraband, because “they do not perform the same checks on socks or jackets—the only items of
staff clothing ever to have been found to secrete contraband.” Id. (Tashima, J., dissenting). Thus,
it seems as though GEO must have some other, unstated reason for disallowing khimars.
Additionally, Judge Tashima notes that Appellants’ expert, George Camp, analyzed the
contraband problem in the prison and found that “[c]omparing the types of serious contraband
items reported prior to the change in the khimar policy on October 24, 2005, with a comparable
length of time after it was changed, reveals that the number of contraband items found at the
facility actually rose by 91 percent.” Id. at 288 (Tashima, J., dissenting).
260. Id. at 267.
261. There are multiple styles of khimars, and the court itself notes that neither party
described the particular style worn by the Appellants. Id. at 268 n.1. The complaint states that a
khimar is “an Islamic religious head scarf, designed to cover the hair, forehead, sides of the head,
neck, shoulders, and chest.” Complaint at 3, EEOC v. GEO Group, Inc., 2009 WL 1382914
(E.D. Pa. May 18, 2009) (No. 07-cv-04043) 2007 WL 4761084. It can also be defined as “a
headscarf worn by observant Muslim women that hangs down to just above the waist.” Khimar,
DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/khimar (last visited Feb. 17, 2011).
262. GEO Group, 616 F.3d at 275.
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Appellants. The cause they bring before the court is of profound importance;
Appellants seek to defend their right to freely practice their religion, as found
in Title VII and reinforced time and again by Congress. Thus, in weighing the
nature of the interests—safety and security against religious tolerance and
freedom—along with the real burden on those interests—potentially very low
against a total loss of the interest—the analysis clearly favors Appellants.
Some courts have recognized the true intent of Congress in enacting Title
VII. The court in Ali v. Southeast Neighborhood House noted that:
The overriding concern of Congress in enacting Title VII was the elimination
of discrimination in employment. Employees are sheltered from bigotry and
discrimination emanating from the employer’s actions towards that employee’s
most personal, most cherished religious beliefs and values.
These
considerations should be viewed by a Court with special sensitivity to their
263
meaningful uniqueness.

Though the GEO Group court does not question the sincerity of Appellants
beliefs, it does not seem to accord those beliefs with the high regard that
Congress, through Title VII, contemplated.
The Third Circuit itself defended Muslims’ right to religious observance in
the context of the First Amendment. In Fraternal Order of Police v. City of
Newark, the court found that a police department’s policy banning religious
beards did not survive the heightened scrutiny test under the First
Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause.264 It noted that, similar to GEO, the
police department wanted to convey an image of a “‘monolithic, highly
disciplined force’ and that ‘[u]niformity [of appearance] not only benefits the
men and women that risk their lives on a daily basis, but offers the public a
sense of security in having readily identifiable and trusted public servants.’”265
The police department alleged that the public may not recognize a bearded
Muslim man as genuine police officer, and that this would undermine public
safety.266 In this case, unlike in Webb and GEO Group, the court did not
accept the safety argument.267 Instead, it found that there was no distinction
between the department’s allowance of beards for medical purposes, and the
prohibition on beards for religious ones.268 Though this was a constitutional
case, Title VII’s protection of religion can be seen as an extension of that
important First Amendment principle.

263. Ali v. Se. Neighborhood House, 519 F. Supp. 489, 497 (D.D.C. 1981).
264. 170 F.3d 359 (3d Cir. 1999). The opinion was penned by Justice Alito prior to his
appointment to the United States Supreme Court.
265. Id. at 366.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 366–67.
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The majority in GEO Group rejected Judge Tashima’s argument that other
employees in GEO’s prison are allowed to wear hats as a red herring.269
However, under GEO’s morale and esprit de corps interests, the only
distinction between Appellants and those other employees allowed to wear hats
is a concern for food safety. The GEO Group majority may claim that this is a
difference between wearing headgear for the benefit of others, as with the
kitchen workers, and wearing headgear for a personal benefit, as with
Appellants. Still, Appellants’ need to follow their religion’s precepts should be
considered at least as important as food safety. Food safety is not a value
expressly protected by our Constitution.
The GEO Group court’s failure to protect Muslims’ religious rights is
especially harmful in the current climate of fear, intolerance, and ignorance
toward Muslims. Particularly since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001,
Muslims in the United States have been subjected to unwarranted bigotry.270

269. GEO Group, 616 F.3d at 276.
270. Public opinion polls demonstrate that American attitudes toward Muslims vary by,
among other things, the respondents’ level of fear of new terrorist attacks, personal religiosity,
and party affiliation. SIMON & ABDEL-MONEIM, supra note 113, at 29. Forty percent of
Republicans, thirty-seven percent of those who have a high fear of terrorist attacks, and forty-two
percent of those who are highly religious, want Muslims to register with the government. Id. at
30–31. Similar percentages in those groups support close government monitoring of mosques.
Id. Just over forty percent of all respondents indicated that they honestly had some feelings of
prejudice against Muslims. Id. at 34. Still, U.S. public opinion toward Muslims is not the worst
among Western nations. Id. at 36–39. As to whether Muslims are a threat to national security,
and whether they have been subjected to unjustified criticism, the U.S. public runs about the
middle of the pack among Great Britain, France, Italy, Spain and Germany. Id. An ABC News
poll from 2006 found a much higher incidence of anti-Muslim attitudes since 2002. ABC
News/Washington Post Poll supra note 113. In 2006, the percentage of Americans believing that
Islam does not respect non-believers and that it encourages violence against them was double that
of 2002. Id. Additionally, forty-six percent of respondents had a generally unfavorable view of
Islam, which was again nearly double the percentage from 2002. Id. In a Pew Research Center
study, a quarter of Muslim-Americans said they had experienced discrimination. PEW RESEARCH
CTR., MUSLIM AMERICANS: MIDDLE CLASS AND MOSTLY MAINSTREAM 4 (2007) [hereinafter
MIDDLE CLASS AND MOSTLY MAINSTREAM]. A majority also said that either discrimination,
being viewed as a terrorist, ignorance about Islam, and stereotyping was their biggest concern.
Id. at 36. Though many U.S. Muslims have gone to great lengths to display their patriotism and
desire to combat extremism, some are exhausted by the constant struggle to prove themselves to a
skeptical American society. See Jeff Karoub, US Muslims Find Defending Themselves
Exhausting, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 12, 2011, 5:25 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/huffwires/20110312/us-muslims-terror-hearing-mood; see also DAVID SCHANZER, CHARLES
KURZMAN & EBRAHIM MOOSA, ANTI-TERROR LESSONS OF MUSLIM-AMERICANS 1 (2010)
(finding that anti-Muslim bias has increased since September 11, 2001, and even so,
radicalization of Muslim-Americans has been extremely limited); PEW FORUM ON RELIGION &
PUBLIC LIFE, VIEWS OF RELIGIOUS SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES: MUSLIMS WIDELY SEEN
AS FACING DISCRIMINATION 1 (2009) (finding that many non-Muslim Americans feel that Islam
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Nearly every week, national and local news media carry new stories of
controversy regarding Muslims.271 Studies show that the intolerant attitude

is very different from their own faith and nearly sixty percent believe that Muslims are subject to
more discrimination than other major religious groups).
271. There are stories about Muslims in the United States generally, as well as about the
feelings of and toward American Muslims. See, e.g., Stephen Collinson, Obama Calls on
Americans to Unite, Not Divide, Over Islam, THE AGE (Sept. 11, 2010), http://news.the
age.com.au/breaking-news-world/obama-calls-on-americans-to-unite-not-divide-over-islam20100911-155d3.html; Mark Egan, Fears Rise Over Growing Anti-Muslim Feeling in U.S.,
REUTERS (Sept. 12, 2010, 12:53 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/09/12/us-usa-mus
lims-view-idUSTRE68B1O920100912; Karin Zeitvogel, US Ill-Prepared to Face Homegrown
Terror Threat: Report, AFP (Sept. 10, 2010), http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/
ALeqM5jVDY22EZWni0vYlKlgMMMMUJUjQw; Cristina Silva, Sharron Angle: Muslim Law
Taking Hold in Parts of U.S., HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 7, 2010, 8:03 PM), http://www.huffington
post.com/2010/10/08/sharron-angle-muslim-law-_n_755346.html. Even a decade after the
attacks of September 11, U.S. Muslims still face discrimination. See supra note 270. Yet, with
the death of Osama Bin Laden—who not only hijacked planes but also the identity of an entire
religion—American Muslims are hopeful for a chance to show the country who they really are.
See Liz Goodwin, Muslim Americans Still Find Acceptance Elusive in the Wake of Bin Laden’s
Death, THE LOOKOUT (May 11, 2011), http://news.yahoo.com/blogs/look out/muslim-americansstill-acceptance-elusive-wake-bin-laden-194318677.html.
One of the most notorious controversies relating to Islam is the Islamic cultural center in New
York City near the former location of the World Trade Center towers, known to some as the
“Ground Zero” mosque. See, e.g., David B. Caruso, On Paper, NY Islamic Center Looks
Modern, Secular, WASH. POST, Oct. 2, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2010/10/02/AR2010100201683.html; Toby Harnden, Imam Blames Palin for Rise of
‘Islamophobia’, DAILY TELEGRAPH, Sept. 13, 2010, at 13; Imam Says NYC Mosque Site is not
‘Hallowed Ground’, USA TODAY, Sept. 13, 2010, http://www.usatoday.com/news/religion/201009-13-nyc-mosque-imam_N.htm; Henrick Karoliszyn et al., Protesters Reach Fevered Pitch,
N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Sept. 12, 2010, at 7; ‘US Mosque Row Feeds Radicals’, AL JAZEERA (Sept.
13, 2010), http://english.aljazeera.net/news/americas/2010/09/2010912212355219577.html. For
information about Islamic cultural centers like this one, see ESPOSITO, supra note 27, at 38.
Another contentious story is the plan to burn the Qur’an by pastors in Florida and Kansas.
See, e.g., Antonio Gonzalez, Anti-Koran Pastor Plans to Meet With NY Imam, WASH. TIMES
(Sept. 9, 2010), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/sep/9/koran-burning-off-as-minister
-claims-success/; Brad Knickerbocker, Florida Church May Not Burn Qurans, But Kansas
Church Says it Will, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, (Sept. 10, 2010, 4:50 PM) http://www.cs
monitor.com/USA/Society/2010/0910/Florida-church-may-not-burn-Qurans-but-Kansas-churchsays-it-will; Mitra Malek, Muslims Relieved But Say Damage Has Been Done, PALM BEACH
POST, Sept. 9, 2010, at 1A; Antonio Gonzalez, Pastor Cancels Quran-Burning, Then
Reconsiders, AJC (Sept. 9, 2010, 11:10 PM), http://www.ajc.com/news/nation-world/pastor-can
cels-quran-burning-609858.html; Muslim World Seethes; US ‘Cult’ Calls Off Plan to Burn Holy
Book, ARAB NEWS (Sept. 11, 2010, 6:04 PM), http://arabnews.com/world/article133784.ece?com
ments=all.
Even Congresspersons can be swept up in anti-Muslim sentiments. Representative Peter
King, chairman of the House Homeland Security Committee, called hearings to discuss the
“radicalization” of American Muslims. James Oliphant, Rep. Peter King Defends Muslim
‘Radicalization’ Hearing, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 10, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/mar/10/na
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toward Muslims is unjustified.272 Most American Muslims (and for that matter
most Muslims worldwide) are not extremists; they are middle-class people
who support their country and the opportunities it provides just as much as any
other religious or ethnic group.273 Islam is projected to become the secondlargest religious group in America behind Christianity during the first half of
this century.274 Just as Catholicism began as a small, persecuted religion in the
tion/la-na-muslim-house-hearing-20110311.
King defended the hearings as part of the
committee’s duty to protect the United States from terrorist attack, including protecting from
internal sources, stating that “[t]o back down would be a craven surrender to political
correctness,” and that “there is nothing radical or un-American in holding these hearings.” Id.
Critics counter that these hearings are akin to Joseph McCarthy’s anti-Communism hearings of
the 1940s and 1950s. Id. Representative Keith Ellison, a Muslim Congressman from Minnesota,
opposed the hearings as “stereotyping and scapegoating.” Id. Muslim leaders in the United
States. expressed concern that these hearings would fail their express purpose—instead of rooting
out extremists, they would only alienate the Muslim community and drive more to join terrorist
groups. See id.; Karoub, supra; Chris Michaud, Muslims, Supporters Protest Congressional
Hearing, REUTERS (Mar. 6, 2011, 6:53 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/06/usmuslim-protest-idUSTRE7252VY20110306.
There are even a few stories concerning Islamic dress, most notably the debate in France over
a possible ban on Muslim women’s veils. See, e.g., Elaine Ganley, French Senate Passes Ban on
Full Muslims Veils, (WASH. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2010) http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/
2010/sep/14/french-senate-passes-ban-full-muslim-veils/; Sarkozy: France Firm on Burqa Ban
Despite Threat from Osama bin Laden, CHI. TRIB. (Oct. 29, 2010, 8:45 AM) http://www.chicago
tribune.com/news/local/sns-ap-bin-laden-tape,0,326701.story. Muslim women of all ages may
potentially be subject to dress-based discrimination. See Cameron Smith, Muslim Headscarf
Forces Teen Girl to Bench in Hoops Game, PREP RALLY (Jan. 21, 2011 12:41 PM), http://rivals.
yahoo.com/highschool/blog/prep_rally/post/Muslim-headscarf-forces-teen-girl-to-bench-in-ho?
urn=highschool-310716.
Some Muslim employees have successfully reached an accommodation on their religious
garb. See Disney, Muslim Worker Agree on Hijab Substitute, USA TODAY (Sept. 29, 2010),
http://www.usatoday.com/news/religion/2010-09-29-disney-muslim_N.htm.
Finally, some stories demonstrate that American Muslims can take steps beyond litigation to
defend their rights and have in fact reached out to repair their faith’s image in U.S. society. See,
e.g., Patrick Condon, Muslims Take to Minn. State Fair to Repair Image, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 4,
2010, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/sep/4/muslims-take-minn-state-fair-repair-im
age/.
272. See MIDDLE CLASS AND MOSTLY MAINSTREAM, supra note 270, at 1 (noting that most
Muslim-Americans are average Americans).
273. See id.; Eboo Patel, Discrimination Against Muslims, WASH. POST: THE FAITH DIVIDE
(Mar. 20, 2007, 9:41 AM), http://newsweek.washingtonpost.com/onfaith/eboo_patel/2007/03/dis
crimination_against_muslims.html.
274. ESPOSITO, supra note 27, at 169. The actual number of Muslims in the United States is
difficult to determine. MIDDLE CLASS AND MOSTLY MAINSTREAM, supra note 270, at 9. Some
projections stand at six to eight million. Zahid H. Bukhari, Demography, Identity, Space:
Defining American Muslims, in MUSLIMS IN THE UNITED STATES 7, 7–8 (Philippa Strum &
Danielle Tarantolo eds., 2003). Other estimates from 2007 and 2008 are that Muslims comprise
about six-tenths of one percent of the American population, or around 1.35 million people.
BARRY A. KOSMIN & ARIELA KEYSAR, AMERICAN RELIGIOUS IDENTIFICATION SURVEY:
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United States, and was gradually accepted,275 the same will likely occur with
Islam.
Additionally, Muslims are mostly foreign-born immigrants.276 Like all
minority and immigrant groups that have come to the United States throughout
our country’s history, Muslims will at first be feared and oppressed.277
Eventually, these former minorities became so numerous, and became such an
essential part of American culture, that discrimination against them faded
away, or at least became less pronounced.278 History will likely repeat itself
with regards to the current Muslim minority, and there is no reason why the
process of initial discrimination and later acceptance cannot be accelerated.
An analogy may be drawn between Muslims’ situation today and the
historical practice of prejudice against people of a particular nationality or
ethnicity in a time of war against that nationality or ethnicity. Kristin
Pruszynski makes the analogy between Muslims after September 11, 2001, and

SUMMARY REPORT 5 (2009). Judaism, currently the largest minority religion, stands at about 2.7
million. Id.
275. See JAY P. DOLAN, THE AMERICAN CATHOLIC EXPERIENCE: A HISTORY FROM
COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 127–28 (1992) (giving an account of the emergence of
Catholicism in the United States).
276. Bukhari, supra note 274, at 9; MIDDLE CLASS AND MOSTLY MAINSTREAM, supra note
270, at 1; Abdul Malik Mujahid, Muslims In America: Profile, ALLIED MEDIA CORP.,
http://www.allied-media.com/AM/AM-profile.htm (last visited Sept. 12, 2010).
277. This pattern has reoccurred from the earliest years of U.S. history. It began with the
Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798, directed at potential American Jacobins, and continued with
discrimination against many immigrant nationalities, such as the Irish, Italians, and various Asian
ethnic groups in the mid to late nineteenth century. Karl E. Meyer, Slouching Down Xenophobe
Alley, WORLD POL’Y J., Winter 2002/03, at 85, 85. The Red Scare of 1919–1920 saw
Communists oppressed, and there was even a backlash against Jews fleeing Germany in the
1930s. Id. Unfortunately, this sad story is being repeated in modern times, most prominently
with Hispanics. See Ricardo A. López, Why are There so Many Americans Against Latino
Immigration?, LATINO OPINION (Apr. 23, 2009), http://www.latinoopinion.com/2009/04/whyare-there-so-many-americans-against-latino-immigration/.
278. See William Dvorak, Editor’s Introduction to The Challenge of Assimilation, in
IMMIGRATION IN THE UNITED STATES 81 (William Dvorak ed., 2009). Sociological studies show
that immigrants have a number of options when entering the United States. Wallace E. Lambert
et al., Assimilation vs. Multiculturalism: Views from a Community in France, 5 SOC. FORUM 387,
388 (1990). They can assimilate into an American lifestyle, giving up some or all of the culture
of their home country. Id. Immigrants can also choose multiculturalism, keeping their own
culture as best they can. Id. Alternatively, immigrants can take a middle path through
biculturalism, balancing a need to establish themselves in the United States while remaining true
to their traditions. Id. at 388–89. Kathleen Moore questions how pluralistic (synonymous with
biculturalistic) Muslims can be in modern American society, given their internal struggles to
define what it means to be Muslim, and external struggles against a society and government
which is distrustful and even hateful. See Kathleen M. Moore, Muslims in the United States:
Pluralism under Exceptional Circumstances, 612 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 116
(2007).
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racially-motivated discrimination against Japanese-Americans after Pearl
Harbor.279 The United States is fighting wars in two countries that are
predominantly Muslim, in a region where most of the world’s Muslims live.
As we did with the Japanese in World War II, instead of attempting to
differentiate between those who wish harm upon Americans and those who
support the United States like any other citizens, we discriminate against all
U.S. Muslims.280 Though the U.S. Muslim population is not subject to
internment as the Japanese were, the discrimination they face in the public
realm is nevertheless extremely harmful.281 Recognizing these patterns from
history means that we can attempt to stop them from reoccurring.
Some scholars have suggested solutions to the problem of religious
accommodation in the workplace, specifically in relation to Muslims. Some
have recommended changes to the courts’ Title VII interpretation. Bilal
Zaheer advocates for a reinterpretation of section 701(j) which adds a
centrality aspect in assessing the employee’s beliefs.282 The need for
accommodation would depend on how central the religious practice is to the
employee’s religion, would protect minority religions such as Islam, and would
ensure that employees had the ability to remain true to the key tenets of their
faith.283 Jamie Prenkert and Julie Magid argue that the weak undue hardship
standard presents employees with a Hobson’s choice: either violate their
employer’s rules or continue their religious practice.284 They find that courts
maintain this hardship standard because the bar for what qualifies as religious
belief is low, and courts do not want to force employers to accommodate any

279. Kristin Moyé Pruszynski, Comment, Living in a Post 9/11 World: Religious
Discrimination Against Muslims 2 PHX L. REV. 361, 367–68 (2009).
280. The case of Korematsu v. United States shows that the Japanese were subject to
“hysterical discrimination” as U.S. Muslims are today. See id. at 367–68. There, Toyosaburo
“Fred” Korematsu, a Japanese-American, was convicted of violating President Roosevelt’s
internment order. Id. at 366. Korematsu’s loyalty to the United States was never questioned, and
he was even registered for the draft at the time of his arrest. Id. at 366–67. Even those who were
“ready, willing and able” to fight for and support the United States, as Korematsu was, were
discriminated against. See id. at 367.
281. See supra notes 270–71 and accompanying text for examples of this discrimination. The
negative effects of discrimination can include harassment, threats, property damage, personal
attacks, and, of course, employment discrimination. See N.Y.C. COMM’N ON HUMAN RIGHTS,
DISCRIMINATION AGAINST MUSLIMS, ARABS, AND SOUTH ASIANS IN NEW YORK CITY SINCE
9/11 16 (2003).
282. Zaheer, supra note 69, at 522.
283. Id. at 522–24.
284. Prenkert & Magid, supra note 101, at 468. A “Hobson’s choice” is a seemingly free
choice between multiple options when “in fact there is no choice at all.” Id. at 468 n.5. More
appropriate to an employee’s choice under Title VII case law, this phrase also refers to “situations
in which the choice involves two undesirable options.” Id.
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and every religious practice.285 To combat this, Prenkert and Magid suggest
creating a higher standard for sincerity of religious belief that requires
objective evidence.286 This analysis would encourage employers to make
reasonable, objective, generally-applicable work rules based on genuine
business needs.287
Roberto Corrada proposes that the accommodation framework should be
combined with a neutrality prong taken from disparate treatment cases.288
Corrada would require an employer to show that they are “neutral” to an
employee’s religious belief or practice in the workplace, after the employee
makes their prima facie case.289 If this is shown, the analysis continues as
before to reasonability of accommodation and undue hardship.290 As has
always been the case, Congress itself can act to shift the balance away from the
employer and toward the employee. The latest version of WRFA (2010) is yet
another attempt to force courts to adopt more employee-friendly tests.291
Others have looked for ways to counteract the current trend of anti-Islamic
sentiment in the United States. Amany Hacking notes that while some recent
civil litigation by Muslims has gained a few victories for Muslim civil rights,
the Muslim-American community still needs to be more proactive if it wants to
end this wave of discrimination.292 Aliah Abdo agrees that courts have failed
to protect Muslim women’s rights to wear a hijab, deferring to the reasons that
government and private parties give for requiring its removal.293 Only when
courts stand up to defend their religious rights “will Muslim women able to
fully participate in society.”294 Specifically in the employment context, Kristin
Pruszynski suggests that employers and government agencies should help

285. Id. at 487–90.
286. Id. at 501.
287. Id. at 472.
288. Roberto L. Corrada, Toward an Integrated Disparate Treatment and Accommodation
Framework for Title VII Religion Cases, 77 U. CIN. L. REV. 1411, 1432–34 (2009).
289. Id. at 1433.
290. Id. at 1433–34.
291. S. 4046, 111th Cong. (2010). This bill, introduced by Senator John Kerry, specifically
finds that the Hardison decision was “contrary to the intent of Congress.” Id. at § 2(3). It
continues: “As a consequence of the Hardison decision and resulting appellate and trial court
decisions, discrimination against employees on the basis of religion in employment continues to
be an unfortunate and unacceptable reality.” Id. at § 2(4). The standard for undue hardship
(“significant difficulty or expense”) remains the same as the 2007 House and 2008 Senate WRFA
bills discussed earlier in Part I.A. See id. § 4(a)(3).
292. Amany R. Hacking, A New Dawn for Muslims: Asserting Their Civil Rights in Post-9/11
America, 54 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 917, 940–41 (2010).
293. Aliah Abdo, Note, The Legal Status of Hijab in the United States: A Look at the
Sociopolitical Influences on the Legal Right to Wear the Muslim Headscarf, 5 HASTINGS RACE &
POVERTY L.J. 441, 505–06 (2008).
294. Id. at 507.
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themselves and Muslims by conducting extensive religious tolerance and
accommodation training.295
All of these solutions are appropriate to address this issue. What is most
important is that something actually be done by courts, employers, and the
government. They must protect Muslim rights, genuinely seek meaningful
accommodations, and train employers on religious tolerance, respectively.
Though some may argue that because some countries that are primarily
Muslim do not accord wide religious freedom, the United States is free to
respond in kind.296 This is irrelevant and improper. Our country’s values and
our Constitution protect religious freedom, and refusing to sacrifice this
principle when others violate it is the very thing that sets us apart from less
tolerant nations.
CONCLUSION
In GEO Group, the court followed the trend in Title VII religious
accommodation law, which favors an employer’s business interests over an
employee’s religious beliefs. This preferential treatment for employers, though
widespread, is inappropriate. Congress has repeatedly declared its intent to
prioritize employees’ rights to freely practice their faith, through the addition
of section 701(j) and in the proposed WRFA legislation. First Amendment
case law demonstrates the appropriate level of deference and respect that
should be accorded to an employee’s sincere beliefs.297 The Third Circuit in
GEO Group went against this statutory and Constitutional basis for the
protection of religious freedom, and instead deferred to an employer’s
speculation as to harms it might suffer if it accommodated Appellants.
The court should also have taken special care to protect the rights of the
three Muslim women who were the Appellants in GEO Group. Muslims are
susceptible to unjustifiable prejudice in modern American society. Courts
should be particularly sensitive to complaints of workplace discrimination
from Muslims. There, employers and management may abuse their positions
of power over Muslim employees to discriminate against them. The Third
Circuit based its decision on precedent, which is admittedly the majority
view.298 Still, judges are a part of society, and current trends and issues
influence them, whether consciously or not.299 Judges must take special care

295. Pruszynski, supra note 279, at 378–80.
296. For examples of arguments questioning the inclusiveness and peacefulness of Islam, see
THE MYTH OF ISLAMIC TOLERANCE: HOW ISLAMIC LAW TREATS NON-MUSLIMS (Robert
Spencer ed., 2005).
297. See supra notes 264–68 and accompanying text.
298. See supra Part I.A.
299. Paul Secunda addresses this so-called “cognitive bias” of judges. Paul M. Secunda,
Cultural Cognition at Work, 38 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 107 (2010). He argues that in employment
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to ensure they do not follow the riled, yet ignorant, or in fact hateful, masses
towards the devaluation or destruction of employees’ religious rights.
The lawmakers, including not only the legislative but also the judicial and
executive branches, are the only bulwark against waves of popular sentiment
which run counter to our country’s core beliefs.300 The judicial branch must do
its part in this scheme. While some may criticize the judiciary as sabotaging
the will of the people,301 they fail to understand its role. Congress acts for the
majority of the people, and that body passed Title VII. Under Title VII, the
will of the majority is to protect the minority, being those groups who may be
subject to workplace discrimination. The courts must help enforce this law,
interpreting it in favor of protecting minorities. Thus, no matter how popular
discrimination against Muslims may become, it is the courts’ role to stop it.
Courts must remind the public where the primary source of religious freedom
lies—in the Constitution—and why it was included there. Because the
workplace is a public venue, and the one we spend most of our “public” time
in, it is absolutely essential that the courts take a strong stance against religious
discrimination in the work environment.
The Third Circuit had an opportunity to set original precedent on religious
discrimination in the workplace involving Muslim dress. In Webb, the Circuit
lost a chance to defend religious freedom while the country was gripped by a
climate of fear and intolerance against Muslims. The GEO Group decision
takes that Circuit further away from the basic principles of Title VII and the
Constitution. It is hoped that the Third Circuit sees fit to distance itself from
this precedent in future cases, or that other Circuits distinguish themselves
from the Third.
NATHAN K. BADER*

and labor cases, the common view that a judge’s political viewpoint will determine their decision
on any contentious issue—that conservatives will side with employers and liberals will side with
employees—is incorrect. Id. at 110. Rather, a judge’s cultural background is more important.
Id. at 109. Secunda contends that judicial humility and pluralistic opinion-writing can reduce the
impact of this culture-based bias. Id. at 111.
300. Judge Patel, in overturning the 1942 conviction of a Japanese-American charged under
racist motivation, described the principle eloquently: “[I]n times of international hostility and
antagonisms our institutions, legislative, executive and judicial, must be prepared to exercise their
authority to protect all citizens from the petty fears and prejudices that are so easily aroused.”
Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406, 1420 (N.D. Cal. 1984), quoted in Pruszynski,
supra note 279, at 380.
301. Sarah Palin recently commented that the California district court decision striking down
Prop. 8 as unconstitutional was “that third branch of government undoing the will of the people.”
John Diaz, One Judge vs. 7 Million Voters?, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 8, 2010, at E–2.
* I would like to thank Professor Marcia McCormick for her helpful critiques. I would also like to
thank my mother, Carol, and my brother, Christopher, for their encouragement and support.

